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We are entering the age of robots where autonomous robots will drive 
our cars, milk cows, drill for oil, invest in stock, mine coal, build houses, 
pick strawberries, and work as surgeons. Robots, in mimicking the work 
of humans, will also mimic their legal liability. But how do you sue a 
robot? The current answer is that you cannot. Robots are property. They 
are not entities with a legal status that would make them amendable to sue 
or be sued. If a robot causes harm, you have to sue its owner. Corporations 
used to be like this for many procedural purposes. They were similarly 
tethered to human owners. Over time, courts and legislators abandoned 
the model of treating corporations solely as property and increasingly 
treated them as an independent artificial person for litigation purposes. 
Robots might also make a transition along those lines. If they do, 
which legal model should we adopt for robots? Are they more like an 
employee, a franchisee, a slave, a subsidiary, a child, an animal, a 
subcontractor, an agent, or something else altogether? Given the inherent 
path-dependence of procedural law, picking the right model will have 
important consequences and will be difficult to reverse.  
This Article lays the groundwork for this fundamental decision. It 
explains the urgency and importance of this decision and presents three 
analytical frameworks (ontological, deontological, and functional) for 
how we can approach the question of robots in civil litigation. Often 
unnoticed and unarticulated, these analytical frameworks structure 
important doctrinal and normative positions. The Article then applies 
these analytical frameworks to evaluate numerous concrete contestant 
models for treating robots as litigation entities. The resulting taxonomy 
exposes the weaknesses of analogizing robots to established models—none 
fits, and all would have negative practical consequences. Instead of 
utilizing an existing model, this Article argues that we must treat robots 
as a new litigation category that borrows insights selectively and partially 
from a range of the existing models. For example, we must craft a new in 
robotam personal jurisdiction doctrine to supplement the old in personam 
jurisdiction doctrine. Doing otherwise would expose procedure to 
doctrinal incoherence, legislation to policy mayhem, and parties injured 
by robots to unnecessary costs and insurmountable procedural hurdles.  
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Welcome to the age of robots. They drive our trucks,1 milk cows,2 drill for oil,3 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Conner Dougherty, Self-Driving Trucks May Be Closer than They Appear, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/business/self-driving-
trucks.html [https://perma.cc/2U44-UWTP] (“Trucks will someday drive themselves out of 
warehouses and cruise down freeways without the aid of humans or even a driver’s cab — 
about that there seems little disagreement. The question is how soon that day gets here.”); 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber’s Self-Driving Trucks Hit the Highway, But Not Local Roads, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/technology/uber-self-
driving-trucks.html [https://perma.cc/67PC-K4VV] (“Uber said . . . its self-driving trucks 
have been carrying cargo on highways in Arizona for commercial freight customers over the 
past few months.”). 
2 Jesse McKinley, With Farm Robotics, the Cows Decide when it’s Milking Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/nyregion/with-farm-robotics-
the-cows-decide-when-its-milking-time.html [https://perma.cc/ZW9T-HHHZ] (“Desperate 
for reliable labor and buoyed by soaring prices, dairy operations across the state are charging 
into a brave new world of udder care: robotic milkers, which feed and milk cow after cow 
without the help of a single farmhand.”). 
3 Clifford Krauss, Texas Oil Fields Rebound from Price Lull, But Jobs Are Left Behind, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/business/energy-
2018] HOW TO SUE A ROBOT 1023 
invest in stock,4 mine coal,5 lay bricks,6 pick strawberries,7 and work as 
longshoreman.8 A broad literature anticipates that robots will do more and more jobs 
in the years to come.9 Robots, in mimicking the work of humans, will also mimic 
                                               
environment/oil-jobs-technology.html?_r=0#story-continues-1 [https://perma.cc/QWG7-
TFRS] (“Pretty soon every rig will have one worker and a robot.”). 
4 See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 687 (2013) 
(“Modern finance is cyborg finance, an industry in which the key players are part human and 
part machine.”); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital 
Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (2015) (“[T]oday’s marketplace has come to rely 
heavily on automation and algorithms as an essential part of the trading process.”); Nils 
Pratley, The Trillion-Dollar Questions over the Flash Crash and the Hound of Hounslow, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/25/flash-crash-
hound-of-hounslow-trillion-dollar-question [https://perma.cc/YKU3-2UV4] (explaining 
how autonomous machines that trade stocks in fractions of a second caused a “flash crash”); 
see also Landon Thomas Jr., At BlackRock, Machines Are Rising over Managers to Pick 
Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/deal 
book/blackrock-actively-managed-funds-computer-models.html [https://perma.cc/RPD7-
LNWS] (“‘The democratization of information has made it much harder for active 
management,’ Mr. Fink said in an interview. ‘We have to change the ecosystem — that 
means relying more on big data, artificial intelligence, factors and models within quant and 
traditional investment strategies.’”).  
5 Hiroko Tabuchi, Coal Mining Jobs Trump Would Bring Back No Longer Exist, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/coal-jobs-trump-
appalachia.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FRC2-RDGW] (“Caterpillar engineers are working 
on the future of mining: mammoth haul trucks that drive themselves. The trucks have no 
drivers, not even remote operators. Instead, the 850,000-pound vehicles rely on self-driving 
technology, the latest in an increasingly autonomous line of trucks and drills that are 
removing some of the human element from digging for coal. . . . Caterpillar’s autonomous 
trucks are already being used at mines in Western Australia.”); see also Driving Productivity 
in the Pilbara, RIOTINTO, http://www.riotinto.com/ourcommitment/spotlight-
18130_18328.aspx [https://perma.cc/24XS-CTT9] (last updated June 1, 2016). 
6 Vice News, This Bricklaying Robot Can Build Walls Faster than Humans (HBO), 
YOUTUBE (July 26, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-VR4IcDhX0 
[https://perma.cc/4GBV-M2DY]; see also Quoctrung Bui & Roger Kisby, Bricklayers Think 
They’re Safe from Robots. Decide for Yourself, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/07/upshot/bricklayers-think-theyre-safe-
from-automation-robots.html [https://perma.cc/GSU2-EXTZ]. 
7 Ilan Brat, Robots Step into New Planting, Harvesting Roles, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 
23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robots-step-into-new-planting-harvesting-roles-
1429781404 [https://perma.cc/Z7HF-HPCK]. 
8 See, e.g., Andrew O’Reilly, Automation of Port Terminals Threatens Thousands of 
Lucrative Dock Worker Jobs, FOX NEWS U.S. (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/ 
2017/03/27/automation-port-terminals-threatens-thousands-lucrative-dock-worker-jobs. 
html [https://perma.cc/9R2Y-PL54] (“‘Those robots represent hundreds of (lost) jobs,’ 
Bobby Olvera Jr., president of International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 13, told 
the Press-Telegram. ‘It means hundreds of people that aren’t shopping. They aren’t paying 
taxes and they aren’t buying homes.’”). 
9 See RICHARD YONCK, HEART OF THE MACHINE: OUR FUTURE IN THE WORLD OF 
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their legal liability. Autonomous cars and trucks will cause accidents.10 Robots will 
engage in war crimes.11 Paparazzi drones will invade private spaces.12 Corporate 
robots will breach contracts.13 Machine doctors will botch surgeries.14 Artificial 
                                               
ARTIFICIAL EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE xi (2017) (exploring a near future where robots are 
“designed to read, interpret, replicate, and potentially even influence human emotions.”); 
JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE: THE QUEST FOR COMMON GROUND 
BETWEEN HUMANS AND ROBOTS 27 (2016); MARTIN FORD, THE RISE OF THE ROBOTS: 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 1 (2015); JERRY KAPLAN, HUMANS 
NEED NOT APPLY: A GUIDE TO WEALTH AND WORK IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 10 (2015); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE 
AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 173 
(2014). 
10 See, e.g., Faiz Siddiqui & Michael Laris, Self-Driving Uber Strikes and Kills 
Pedestrian, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-
gridlock/wp/2018/03/19/uber-halts-autonomous-vehicle-testing-after-a-pedestrian-is-struck 
/?utm_term=.5294aeea968e [https://perma.cc/7T28-U6XY] (“Uber abruptly halted testing 
of its autonomous vehicles across North America on Monday, after a 49-year old woman 
was struck and killed by one of its cars while crossing a Tempe, Ariz. Street Sunday night.”); 
Charles Rotter, Self-Driving Uber Running Red Light, YOUTUBE (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CdJ4oae8f4 [https://perma.cc/Q28S-PS95]; Kenneth 
S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for 
Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 19) (“The current driver-focused liability system will become a thing of the 
past, by virtue of technological change itself—there will be very few occasions for drivers 
to be negligent, because there will be very little “driving” by people. Auto manufacturers 
will still be making vehicles, however, and their vehicles will be the cause of most 
accidents.”). 
11 See John Yoo, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons 
Technologies, 105 CAL. L. REV. 443, 449–57 (2017).  
12 Andreas Ulrich et al., Snapping Tina’s Wedding: Paparazzi Turn to Drones, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/International/snapping-tinas-wedding-
paparazzi-turn-drones/story?id=19842233 [https://perma.cc/SW7F-EQQ7]; see generally 
Margot Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983 (2017) (discussing privacy 
concerns caused by “home robots”). 
13 See generally Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (1996) (analyzing a computer’s ability to enter into and enforce 
contracts); see also Daisuke Wakabayashi, Meet the People Who Train the Robots (to Do 
Their Own Jobs), N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/techn 
ology/meet-the-people-who-train-the-robots-to-do-their-own-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/A 
P23-66PQ] (quoting an entrepreneur who aims to innovate how contracts are written through 
machine learning because “legal documents are well suited to machine learning because they 
are highly structured and repetitive”). 
14 See Jane R. Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 383, 384 (2017) (“[T]he most 
important contributions from health and medical AI will substitute not devices, but 
doctors.”); Meera Senthilingham, Would You Let a Robot Perform Your Surgery By It-self?, 
CNN (May 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/health/robot-surgeon-bowel-
operation/ [https://perma.cc/MAY5-HA8U] (“The team showed for the first time that a 
supervised autonomous robot could perform soft-tissue surgery, stitching together a pig’s 
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intelligence will censor speech15 and engage in libel.16 And states will want to tax 
and regulate robots.  
But how can you sue a robot? The current answer is that you cannot. Robots 
are property. They are not entities with a legal status that would make them 
amendable to sue or be sued. If a robot causes harm you have to sue its owner. 
Corporations used to be like that as well for many procedural purposes.17 They were 
similarly once tethered to human actors. For example, federal diversity jurisdiction 
did not assign corporations citizenship.18 Instead, corporations as property had the 
citizenship of all the owners of the corporation.19 Over time, courts and legislators 
                                               
bowel during open surgery — and doing so better than a human surgeon.”); Yohannes 
Kassahun et al., Surgical Robotics Beyond Enhanced Dexterity Instrumentation: A Survey of 
Machine Learning Techniques and their Role in Intelligent and Autonomous Surgical 
Actions, 11 INT’L J. CARS 553, 553 (2016) (reviewing “the current role of machine learning 
(ML) techniques in the context of surgery with a focus on surgical robotics”); Todd C. 




15 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Training Ad Placement Computers to Be Offended, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/technology/google-
training-ad-placement-computers-to-be-offended.html [https://perma.cc/7PAA-JQCW] 
(“Google engineers, product managers and policy wonks are trying to train computers to 
grasp the nuances of what makes certain videos objectionable. Advertisers may tolerate use 
of a racial epithet in a hip-hop video, for example, but may be horrified to see it used in a 
video from a racist skinhead group.”). 
16 See Ben Sisario, It’s Not Their Pop Idol, But a Bot Fans Cheer Anyway., N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/media/its-not-their-pop-idol-
but-a-bot-fans-cheer-anyway.html [https://perma.cc/2GLE-A2K6]. 
17 See generally Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (explaining the law’s shifting views of 
corporations); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) (discussing new theories of firm 
identity and legality). 
18 See, e.g., Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809) (describing a 
corporation as an “invisible, intangible, and artificial being” that is “certainly not a citizen” 
for diversity jurisdiction purposes). 
19 See, e.g., Commercial & R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 
U.S. 60, 63 (1840) (“The artificial being, a corporation aggregate, is not, as such, a citizen 
of the United States; yet the Courts of the United States will look beyond the mere corporate 
character, to the individuals of whom it is composed: and if they were citizens of a different 
state from the party sued, they are competent to sue in the Courts of the United States; but 
all the corporators must be citizens of a different state from the party sued. The same 
principle applies to the individuals composing a corporation aggregate, when standing in the 
attitude of defendants, which does when they are in that of plaintiffs.”); see also Hertz Corp. 
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2015) (describing early Supreme Court cases where “the Court 
held that a corporation could invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction based on a 
pleading that the corporation’s shareholders were all citizens of a different State from the 
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abandoned the model of treating corporations solely as property and increasingly 
treated them as an independent artificial person for litigation purposes.20  
Robots might also make a transition along those lines. If they do, which legal 
model should we adopt for robots? Are they more like an employee, a franchisee, a 
slave, a subsidiary, a child, an animal, a subcontractor, an agent, or something else 
altogether? Given the inherent path-dependence of procedural law, picking the right 
model will have important consequences and will be difficult to reverse.21 This 
Article lays the groundwork for this fundamental decision. It aims to inform a broad 
literature that spans across many legal fields with a unified framework for treating 
robots as capable of being sued separately from their owners.22  
This decision about how the law treats robots will only grow in importance as 
robots proliferate across industries, take on more autonomous decision-making, and 
become commonplace on streets, in kitchens, offices, and the skies. Predictably, 
courts and legislators will soon have to establish standards in torts for the reasonable 
                                               
defendants”). 
20 See, e.g., Louisville, Cincinnati,  & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558 
(1844) (“It is, that a corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be 
deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of 
the same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of 
that state, as much as a natural person. Like a citizen it makes contracts, and though in regard 
to what it may do in some particulars it differs from a natural person, and in this especially, 
the manner in which it can sue and be sued, it is substantially, within the meaning of the law, 
a citizen of the state which created it, and where its business is done, for all the purposes of 
suing and being sued.”); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (“The constant 
tendency of judicial decisions in modern times has been in the direction of putting 
corporations upon the same footing as natural persons in regard to the jurisdiction of suits by 
or against them.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed 
to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the 
State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business”). 
21 Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 210 (2016) 
(“[J]udges hold an increasingly outdated mental model of what a robot is.”); see also 
MARKOFF, supra note 9, at xix (2015) (“During the first half of this century, society will be 
tasked with making hard decisions about the smart machines that have the potential to be our 
servants, partners, or masters.”). 
22 As such, this effort has many parallels with the work in the mid-1990s of legal 
scholars to avoid the initial confusion surrounding the characterization and regulation of the 
then emerging phenomena of the Internet. Their insights and shortcomings are deeply 
enshrined in how law and society approach Internet-governance issues. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, 
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 514 (2015) [hereinafter Calo, 
Lessons of Cyberlaw] (“In the mid-1990s, a movement arose among legal academics . . . . 
Known by the name cyberlaw, its central tensions flow from the essential qualities of the 
Internet, by which I mean the characteristics that distinguish the Internet from prior or 
constituent technology such as computers or phones.”). 
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robot,23 in evidence for robot testimony,24 in contract for a meeting of the minds and 
circuits,25 in First Amendment jurisprudence for machine speech,26 in criminal law 
for robotic mens rea, in taxation for how to count the work of robots for 
unemployment insurance purposes,27 in antitrust for fully automated corporations,28 
in policing for robo-police brutality,29 and in intellectual property for whether a robot 
can create copyrightable material30 and patents.31 Much of our doctrinal framework 
might be disrupted by the rise of the machines. But all of these substantive law 
debates presume that we have an answer to the threshold procedural question of how 
to sue a robot and enforce these substantive questions.  
Two simple examples illustrate the importance of how we approach this 
procedural question. Imagine a not-too-distant future in which autonomous trucks 
                                               
23 See generally Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y (forthcoming 2018) (discussing standards for determining tort liability for 
algorithms and their authors). 
24 Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1972 (2017) [hereinafter 
Roth, Machine Testimony] (“[The article] explains why machine sources can be ‘witnesses’ 
under the Sixth Amendment”); see also Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 
1245 (2016) [hereinafter Roth, Trial by Machine] (exploring “the rise of ‘machines’ in 
criminal adjudication”). 
25 See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J. 
CORP. L. 1 (discussing implications of contracts that “writes its own terms or fills its own 
gaps.”).  
26 See generally Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013) (discussing 
how the First Amendment applies to algorithms); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and 
Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013) (analyzing whether algorithms are protected under 
the First Amendment); Toni M. Massaro et al., Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence 
Reveals about the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481 (2017) (discussing the 
extension of free speech rights to AI speakers). 
27 See, e.g., Georgina Prodhan, Europe’s Robots to Become ‘Electronic Persons’ Under 
Draft Plan, REUTERS (June 21, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robotics-
lawmaking-idUSKCN0Z72AY [https://perma.cc/UH3P-PW5B] (noting the EU’s plan to 
make robots ‘electronic persons’ for tax purposes under draft plan). 
28 See, e.g., HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 132–
34, 139–41 (1999) (arguing that antitrust law must limit the growth and extent of fully 
automated corporations run entirely by robots). 
29 See Noel Sharkey et al., The Coming Robot Crime Wave, COMPUTER, Aug. 2010, at 
116 (noting how police departments increasingly rely on robots for police functions).  
30 See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially 
Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 21 (noting that robots, even if authors-in-
fact, cannot hold copyrights because they have no legal personhood); see also About 
Magenta, MAGENTA, https://magenta.tensorflow.org/ [https://perma.cc/37J8-QESP] 
(“Magenta is a research project exploring the role of machine learning in the process of 
creating art and music.”). 
31 See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED 
INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 51–52 (2009) (noting that a company 
used a “Creativity Machine” to generate patentable innovations).  
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crisscross the nation, picking up and depositing cargo on their own.32 A foreign 
company, call it McIntyre Inc., ships these autonomous trucks to the United States.33 
McIntyre hopes to maximize profit as much as it can, wherever it can. It excludes 
no region or State from where the autonomous truck may operate, but, of course, it 
seeks to avoid any legal liability in the United States. One of McIntyre’s trucks 
drives through New Jersey where it is involved in a crash with Nicastro that severs 
four fingers from his right hand. Can Nicastro sue McIntyre in New Jersey, or, really, 
anywhere in the United States?  
If a human had driven the truck, the answer would be fairly straightforward. 
The truck driver is capable of manifesting purposeful availment sufficient to satisfy 
the minimum contacts test.34 She has evinced “implied consent” to personal 
jurisdiction over her in New Jersey courts.35 But a robot, as currently conceptualized, 
is just property. Property cannot have intent (only owners of property can).36 Without 
intent, there can be no purposeful availment, no implied consent, and therefore, no 
personal jurisdiction over McIntyre in New Jersey.37 This result is striking, in part, 
because Nicastro might not have been able to tell whether the truck that injured him 
was driven by a human or an autonomously acting machine. And yet that difference 






                                               
32 See, e.g., Tiffany Hsu, Self-Driving Trucks, Delivery Vans at Vanguard of 
Autonomous Vehicle Revolution, TRUCKS.COM (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.trucks.com/ 
2017/04/13/self-driving-trucks-autonomous-vehicle-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/Q6DD-
BFNQ] (“[L]ong-haul trucks, delivery vans, fleet units and other business-based vehicles 
will be at the front lines as self-driving vehicles are introduced onto city streets.”). 
33 This example is loosely based on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro and borrows 
extensively from Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 
U.S. 873, 893–910 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
34 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case 
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.”) (emphasis added). 
35 Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 887 (2011) (majority opinion) (“At no 
time did petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or 
benefit from the protection of its laws.” (emphasis added)) with id. at 900 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n International Shoe itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain 
that legal fictions, notably ‘presence’ and ‘implied consent,’ should be discarded, for they 
conceal the actual bases on which jurisdiction rests.”). 
36 See Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 539 (“Little is gained, and much is 
arguably lost, by pretending contemporary robots exhibit anything like intent.”). 
37 Intent is, of course, a vital concept in many other areas of law as well (e.g., transferred 
intent in tort).  
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foreign, expensive, and perhaps unsympathetic forum.38 If domestic courts are not 
available, he likely will not sue at all—anywhere.  
Similarly, imagine that New Jersey has a statute that regulates truck deliveries 
and requires contributions to state programs (e.g., a worker’s unemployment fund 
or highway infrastructure fund).39 Even though McIntyre’s autonomous trucks 
contribute to a significant volume of interstate commercial activity that touches on 
New Jersey, McIntyre does not contribute to the state programs as required by the 
state statute. Can the State of New Jersey acquire personal jurisdiction over McIntyre 
and enforce its statutes? The answer to this question determines the viability of its 
substantive regulatory and taxation regimes.40 Perhaps even more striking, the 
answer to this question does not just affect activity within courts, but it could also 
shape whether McIntyre employs humans in New Jersey or opts for machines. How 
we conceptualize robots for jurisdictional purposes shapes liability, regulation and 
taxation regimes, and primary conduct.  
It is not surprising that in personam jurisdiction as here described does not mesh 
easily with robots. They are not persons and courts crafted in personam jurisdiction 
with human persons in mind (with uneasy extensions to corporations). Personal 
jurisdiction is not the only area of procedure where robots do not fit snugly within 
the current doctrinal framework. Other areas of procedure similarly assume human 
or human-like entities. For example, diversity jurisdiction is based on citizenship.41 
Citizenship is a concept easily applied to persons and to corporations by statute,42 
but currently not to robots (thus affecting whether Nicastro in the example above 
has access to federal courts and whether a state court case is removable43). Similarly, 
there is no clear way to serve a summons and complaint on a robot, use tag 
jurisdiction on a robot, to implead robots, to punish robots for spoliation, to claim-
preclude robots,44 garnish wages from a robot, or to conceive of punitive damages 
                                               
38 Relatedly, humans and even corporations can be “at home” in a state and thus subject 
to general jurisdiction. But robots, as currently conceived, cannot be at home anywhere 
because property does not have a home, only a location. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); see also BNSF R.R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It 
is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions of a farflung foreign corporation, who will bear 
the brunt of the majority’s approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with which 
they have no contacts or connection.”). 
39 This example is loosely based on Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
40 As robots do more and more work previously performed by humans, the question of 
how to tax robots will have profound consequences on the tax-base of many jurisdictions 
and the possibility of a wealthy, stable, post-work world.  
41 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).  
42 Id. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and 
foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has 
its principal place of business”). 
43 See, e.g., id. § 1441 (in-state defendant exception).  
44 Does litigation against a robot preclude its owner, does litigation against a robot’s 
owner create a preclusion effect against the robot? See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 
880, 892–93 (2008) (noting the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his 
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against robots.45 Well-established conflict of laws doctrines utilize residency and 
intent to establish a domicile as cornerstones of their practical and normative 
appeal.46 But robots as property cannot have intent to establish a domicile in ways 
humans can.47 All of these doctrines and statutes, among many more, are designed 
with human actors in mind, not autonomous robots.48  
This Article’s main purpose is to take a foundational and broad view at how 
robots could be integrated into our human-centric litigation model. Part I makes clear 
the urgency of filling this procedural gap by descriptively situating the scale of 
autonomous robot-human interactions. Doing so lays the groundwork for the rest of 
the Article by answering “why now?” The answer has much to do with truckers. 
Currently, trucking provides 2 million well-paid blue-collar jobs to people around 
the country.49 What if autonomous robots supplant those jobs and jobs in many other 
sectors of the economy?50 Arguably, that is a far greater threat than outsourcing or 
                                               
own day in court”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
45 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) 
(tying the availability and extent of punitive damages, in part, to whether “the harm was the 
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident”). 
46 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15(2) (1934) (“To acquire a 
domicil of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-place with the intention of making it 
his home.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1)–(2) (1971) (“The 
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local 
law of that state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties” taking into account a variety of factors including “the domicil, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties” (emphasis 
added)).  
47 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith III, Note, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: 
The Unprincipled Use of a Choice of Law Method, 98 YALE L.J. 597 (1989) (noting the 
difficulties associated with attributing a “domicile” to corporations). 
48 On the federal level, capacity to sue is generally tied in this context to state rules that 
currently do not take robots into account. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3) (“Capacity to sue or 
be sued is determined as follows: . . . for all other parties, by the law of the state where the 
court is located.”). 
49 TABLE 2.7 EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT BY INDUSTRY, 2006, 2016, AND PROJECTED 
2026, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_207.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8M6Q-JAZM]. Many more earn a living by driving commercially non-
truck vehicles. Id. 
50 Robots do not threaten all sectors of the economy equally. For example, it is more 
difficult to replace a lawyer with a robot than a fast-food worker. For now. See generally 
Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-intelligence 
.html [https://perma.cc/K8DC-Z9J4] (“[L]ike it or not, a robot is not about to replace your 
lawyer”); Cf. Steve Lohr, A.I. Will Transform the Economy. But How Much, and How Soon?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/technology/ai-will-
transform-the-economy-but-how-much-and-how-soon.html [https://perma.cc/YXK2-
FDT8] (“[T]he number of Americans who will have to find new occupations by 2030 ranges 
from 16 million to 54 million—depending on the pace of technology adoption.”). 
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foreign competition.51 For the first time it is imaginable that robots could soon drive 
many of these trucks cheaper and safer without the need for rest, sleep, or bathroom 
breaks.52 Just as the invention of tractors has made farming more efficient, 
autonomous trucks could make trucking more efficient.53 However, the potential for 
social upheaval is massive. If robots are not properly regulated, taxed, and held 
legally accountable for mistakes, it will only take one highway accident to bring out 
the villagers with pitchforks to burn down every robot in sight.54  
The astonishing expansion of what robots can do, where we use them, and the 
speed with which they are infiltrating society is rendering many legal doctrines 
obsolete. We would do well to deliberate carefully about legal responses to the age 
of robots and adjust our litigation system now in recognition of changes that have 
already taken place and anticipating the further rise of machines. If we do not, civil 
procedure will be obsolete with regard to a huge engine of social and economic 
transformation.  
Part II outlines different analytical frameworks for how we can approach the 
question of robots in civil litigation. It specifies three conceptual approaches that 
help to frame our thinking about the role of non-humans in litigation settings. Often 
unnoticed and unarticulated, these analytical frameworks structure important 
doctrinal and normative thinking. This section makes them explicit and evaluates 
                                               
51 See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 9, at 185 (“[O]ffshoring is often 
only a way station on the road to automation.”); see also Friedhelm Greis, Trump-Regierung 
sorgt sich um Jobs für Trucker [Trump Government Worries About Jobs for Truckers], 
GOLEM.DE (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.golem.de/news/autonome-lkw-trump-regierung-
sorgt-sich-um-jobs-fuer-trucker-1703-126472.html [https://perma.cc/97L4-PLFW]. 
52 See generally COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (2010), 
https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/CarrierResearchResults/PDFs/CMVFacts/CMVFacts-Dec2010-
02082011.pdf [https://perma.cc/76TA-4RKG ] (reporting that trucks are involved in almost 
300,000 accidents a year, 3000 of which result in fatalities). See also Dougherty, supra note 
1 (“Autonomous technology will help trucking companies reduce labor costs in the long run, 
first by extending the number of hours trucks are in operation, and later, by reducing the 
number of drivers. The industry spends billions of dollars a year on accidents that are largely 
caused by human error, and billions more on insurance premiums that should go down if and 
when self-driving technology is proven to be safer than human drivers.”).  
53 See generally Wassily Leontief, National Perspective: The Definition of Problems 
and Opportunities, in THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON EMPLOYMENT AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 3, 3–4 (1983) (“[T]he role of humans as the most important factor of 
production is bound to diminish—in the same way that the role of horses in agricultural 
production was first diminished and then eliminated by the introduction of tractors.”). 
54 See generally Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 517 (“[T]he widespread 
distribution of robotics in society will, like the Internet, create deep social, cultural, 
economic, and of course legal tensions long before the advent of science fiction.”); Kevin 
Roose, His 2020 Campaign Message: The Robots Are Coming, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/technology/his-2020-campaign-message-the-robots-
are-coming.html [https://perma.cc/7XD8-NVCK] (“We have five to 10 years before truckers 
lose their jobs . . . and all hell breaks loose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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their strengths. The first approach is ontological, answering questions about the 
status of robots based on their essential nature. The second approach is 
deontological, grounding litigation rights in moral obligations we have or do not 
have toward robots. The last is functional, asking about the practical effects in 
litigation of treating robots as separate from their owners. A theory of robot litigation 
could also mix and match elements of all three approaches. Whether unconscious or 
deliberate, these three analytical frameworks animate much of our thinking about 
different ways of treating non-humans in the law.  
Part III applies these analytical frameworks to evaluate numerous concrete 
contestant models for treating robots as litigation entities. The possibilities are 
broad, ranging from treating robots for litigation purposes as property, corporations, 
employees, slaves, franchisees, subsidiaries, children, animals, agents, or 
subcontractors. This taxonomy exposes the weaknesses of analogizing robots to 
established models. None fits, and all would have negative practical consequences. 
Part III concludes by exposing the great Faustian bargain inherent in many of the 
existing litigation models. Analogizing robots to an existing model would make 
enforcement of laws easier but would also lower how much can be recovered in 
enforcement. 
To solve this dilemma, Part IV argues that we must treat robots as a new 
litigation category that borrows insights selectively and partially from a range of the 
existing models. For example, we must craft a new in robotam jurisdiction doctrine 
to supplement the old in personam jurisdiction doctrine. We must develop separate 
standards for how a robot establishes a domicile for choice-of-law purposes, how 
liability is shared between robot and owner, how wages are garnished from a robot, 
and the many other procedural rules that hinge on an understanding of intent, 
personhood, and independent agency. Only by unshackling robots from existing 
litigation frameworks can we escape the old Faustian bargain.  
The main arguments against this proposal are that it will be complicated and 
stifle the development of new and exciting robot technology. However, we do not 
want development of just any robot technology. We want responsible robot 
technology that is mindful of the legal harm robots can cause. Only by unbundling 
litigation doctrines and tailoring them to the practical realities of robots as litigation 
entities can we provide courts with the tools and flexibility to take account of rapidly 
developing technology and changing social views of how robots integrate into our 
society.  
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Part IV concludes by looking into the crystal ball and projecting future strengths 
and weaknesses of treating autonomous robots as something other than property for 
litigation purposes. It argues that a procedural status as an artificial person can lay 
the groundwork for a substantive status as a kind of person entitled to basic and 
constitutional rights. Slowly, unintentionally, clandestinely, robots could build on 
procedural foundations to become substantive rights-bearers (just as corporations 
did before them).55 This possibility gives great urgency to procedural discussions 
about the status of robots in our legal system.  
 
I.  THE ROBOTS ARE COMING  
 
Robots in various forms have been with us for a long time, mostly on factory 
floors. However, a tidal wave of new robots is sweeping into public spaces. Robots 
are becoming pervasive and integrated into the fabric of daily life. They drive us 
around, assist us at work, take care of our elders and children,56 and increasingly 
build, grow, and transport the things we eat and consume.57 This section explains 
how robots are doing more, more autonomously, and why they are no longer 
confined to factory floors but exist out there in our shared world. Understanding how 
and why this is happening is the foundation for recognizing the ways in which robots 
might disrupt existing legal regimes (both for good and for bad). This section will 
conclude by highlighting how this potential for disruption is being recognized in 
many substantive areas of law but how procedure has not similarly responded.  
 
A.  Moving Beyond Factories 
 
I will discuss issues surrounding the precise definition of robots below.58 For 
now I will use as a working definition of robots “a mechanical object that exhibits 
near, at, or beyond human autonomous decision-making capacity.” This is a crude 
definition. Its sole purpose is to capture the thought that if I cannot tell whether a 
human or a machine is driving the truck next to me on the highway, then this might 
require us to rethink litigation practices when the truck collides with my car.  
  
                                               
55 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(holding that corporations are protected by the First Amendment). 
56 See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, Co-Parenting with Alexa, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Oct. 7, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/opinion/sunday/children-alexa-echo-robots. 
html [https://perma.cc/Q5HU-BBGG] (“The next generation will grow up in an age where 
it’s normal to be surrounded by autonomous agents, with or without cute names. The Alexas 
of the world will make a raft of decisions for my kids . . . .”). 
57 See also Conrad De Aenlle, A.I. Has Arrived in Investing. Humans Are Still 
Dominating., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/business/ 
ai-investing-humans-dominating.html [https://perma.cc/9JRP-NH3R] (“Machines are 
starting to take the place of the people who flip burgers, drive across town and, lately, manage 
stock portfolios.”). 
58 See infra Section II.A & IV.B. 
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The reason why robots of this variety have suddenly become an issue for civil 
procedure is two-fold: robots can do more than ever, and they are doing it out there 
in the world. Planes, for example, can largely do without pilots these days.59 
Autonomously driving cars can ferry blind passengers.60 As these examples 
illustrate, these robots are no longer confined to factory floors where previous 
generations of robots toiled. Instead, they control machinery in spaces they share 
with all of us.  
This shift is significant because the environments of robots in the past were 
rigidly controlled, and human proximity to them limited.61 Controlling the liability 
surrounding such bolted-down robots was achieved in significant part by fencing 
them off.62 However, barriers and emergency-off buttons are not feasible out there 
on a highway. Similarly, since access to factory robots could be controlled, factory 
owners could limit proximity to these robots to workers covered by workers’ 
compensation regimes, thereby managing their own liability.63 Finally, factory 
robots do not create jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues like autonomous vehicles 
since they stay put and do not cross state lines.  
  
                                               
59 See generally John Markoff, Planes Without Pilots, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/science/planes-without-pilots.html?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/6XRX-2W6N] (“Advances in sensor technology, computing and artificial 
intelligence are making human pilots less necessary than ever in the cockpit. Already, 
government agencies are experimenting with replacing the co-pilot, perhaps even both pilots 
on cargo planes, with robots or remote operators. . . . In a recent survey of airline pilots, those 
operating Boeing 777s reported that they spent just seven minutes manually piloting their 
planes in a typical flight. Pilots operating Airbus planes spent half that time.”). 
60 Google, Self-Driving Car Test: Steve Mahan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE [https://perma.cc/8BT4-6ZA2]. 
61 See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 6 (“To date, automation has mostly meant special-
purpose machines relegated to performing repetitive, single tasks on factory floors, where 
the environment is designed around them. In contrast, these new systems will be out and 
about, tending fields, painting houses, cleaning sidewalks, washing and folding laundry.”). 
62 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., STD 
01-12-002, GUIDELINES FOR ROBOTICS SAFETY (1987) (emphasizing the value of placing 
around robots an “Interlocked Barrier Guard” and “Fixed Barrier Guard” as well as 
“Awareness Barrier Device” and “Presence Sensing Devices”). 
63 See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, 
Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1830–31 (2014) (“Because so many 
robots are used in factories and other employment settings, injuries to workers by robotic 
machines have been the impetus for employees to bring numerous claims. Tort suits against 
employers are complicated by the fact that employees injured on the job are usually covered 
by workers’ compensation. In most states, workers who are injured while working for their 
employer cannot sue the employer in tort; workers’ compensation is their exclusive remedy. 
In effect, the employer is immune from most tort suits brought by an employee.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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B.  More Autonomously 
 
Understanding how robots have left the factory floor is important to assess how 
civil procedure should treat robots. Modern robots are acting more and more 
autonomously than robots of the past because of the confluence of cheap sensors, 
exponential growth in abundant computation power, and breakthroughs in artificial 
intelligence.64 I will focus here on the artificial intelligence element because of the 
potentially serious implications for procedure.  
Until very recently, much programming was algorithmic in nature, leading a 
program through a series of instructions, step-by-step, to a conclusion. Typically, 
and by design, these instructions marched from one set of input to the same set of 
output. This led to the widespread thought in popular culture that computers can 
only do what they are programmed to do. More recently, two new modes of 
programming have shown their practical usefulness: machine learning and genetic 
programming. Both are different from traditional algorithmic programing and might 
disrupt numerous legal frameworks. 
Machine learning typically relies on programming that mimics neural 
networks.65 In this approach, computation is based on multiple layers of artificial 
neurons. Connections between these neurons can be strengthened or weakened over 
time. A program is “trained” on a set of known inputs. For example, the program is 
shown a series of pictures, some containing a chair and some containing a dog.66 
These pre-coded examples help to train the network by adjusting the weights 
between artificial neurons. The advent of big data has contributed to neural 
networking programming because it has greatly expanded (in many areas) the stock 
of pre-coded examples that can be used to train an artificial neural network. One 
famous example is Google Translate. It went from being barely passable to 
surprisingly useful when the team switched to machine learning paired with a deep 
                                               
64 See generally Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 354 (2016) 
(“Artificial intelligence (“AI”) permeates our lives in numerous subtle and not-so-subtle 
ways, performing tasks that, until quite recently, could only be performed by a human with 
specialized knowledge, expensive training, or a government-issued license.”); see also 
Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/99Z3-8XPN]. 
65 As such, I will treat “machine learning” here as a family of computational 
approaches. The discussion reduces a massive amount of complexity and variation for the 
sake of brevity and focus. 
66 Cade Metz, A New Way for Machines to See, Taking Shape in Toronto, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/technology/artificial-intelligence-
research-toronto.html?hpw&rref=technology&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module= 
well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well [https://perma.cc/EKK2-WAWH] 
(“Loosely modeled on the web of neurons in the human brain, neural networks are algorithms 
that can learn discrete tasks by identifying patterns in large amounts of data. By analyzing 
thousands of car photos, for instance, a neural network can learn to recognize a car.”).  
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stock of pre-coded examples from government translation projects.67 Many robots 
that accomplish increasingly more autonomous tasks out there in the world rely on 
such (or similar) machine learning. This is relevant for litigation purposes for what 
it is and for what it is not.  
While machine learning is built on the insights of human neural networks, it 
does not replicate the human brain.68 As the saying goes, airplanes were inspired by 
birds, but they do not flap their wings. Similarly, artificial intelligence built on 
artificial neural networks is inspired by human brains but does not re-create human 
brains in a computational environment. This means, among many other things, that 
we must be very cautious about the use of terms like “artificial intelligence,” “robot 
brain,” “thoughts,” “intention,” and the like. An autonomously driving car on the 
highway might behave a lot like a car driven by a human, but the computational 
thought processes that led to the behavior are very different. Robots do stuff (e.g., 
turn on the blinker and switch lanes). But they do not have intentions, desires, 
passions, or consciousness (all important categories in many areas of law) in the 
same way humans do.69  
Equally startling, artificial neural networks cannot tell us how they do things or 
how they arrived at a conclusion.70 They are inscrutable.71 Even if they get it right 
every time (e.g., sorting pictures of dogs and chairs perfectly), we cannot peer into 
their workings to understand how they accomplish a task.72 To do so would require 
                                               
67 See, e.g., Lewis-Kraus, supra note 64 (“The original Rosetta Stone of statistical 
machine translation was millions of pages of the complete bilingual records of the Canadian 
Parliament.”).  
68 See, e.g., Cade Metz, Chips Off the Old Block: Computers Are Taking Design Cues 
from Human Brains, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/ 
technology/chips-off-the-old-block-computers-are-taking-design-cues-from-human-brains. 
html [https://perma.cc/VZ5P-E6WL] (“[S]ome of the world’s largest tech companies . . . are 
rethinking the very nature of computers and are building machines that look more like the 
human brain . . . .”). 
69 See generally KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“You might reasonably describe [robots] 
as exhibiting superhuman intelligence, but that’s misleading—at least for the foreseeable 
future—because these machines aren’t conscious, self-reflective, and don’t exhibit any hint 
of independent aspirations or personal desires.”). 
70 See, e.g., Tad Friend, Sam Altman’s Manifest Destiny, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/sam-altmans-manifest-destiny [https:// 
perma.cc/298Y-SJRW] (“Y Combinator has even begun using an A.I. bot . . . to help it sift 
admission applications: the bot’s neural net trains itself by assessing previous applications 
and those companies’ outcomes. ‘What’s it looking for?’ I asked Altman. ‘I have no idea,’ 
he replied. ‘That’s the unsettling thing about neural networks—you have no idea what 
they’re doing, and they can’t tell you.’”). 
71 Cade Metz, Competing with the Giants in Race to Build Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/technology/self-driving-cars-
aurora.html [https://perma.cc/ZW38-GVNJ] (“There is no means of determining exactly 
why a machine reaches a particular decision.”). 
72 KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“They are incredibly good at specific tasks, but we don’t 
fully understand how they do what they do.”). 
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us to simulate a complex artificial neural network in our own head.73 This is a task 
that is simply beyond the computational capacity of human brains.  
The second computation approach worth mentioning here is genetic and 
evolutionary programing.74 The basic idea with these approaches is to construct a 
range of programs that perform tasks, compete against each other, and change (often 
randomly) over time.75 Variations of the program that complete tasks well survive 
and thrive. They create more copies of themselves with slight modifications for the 
next iteration. Variations of the program that do not complete tasks well wither and 
eventually die. In this semi-structured manner programs can emerge that were not 
contemplated by any human. A human might have contemplated the process of 
genetic programing, but not the particular program that emerged as a result of the 
process.  
The rise of genetic programming and machine learning (sometimes also 
combined) is relevant to the discussion at hand because it can be used to design 
robots that, in some sense, evolve beyond the intent of their creators. To the extent 
they do, this makes it more difficult to ascribe the intent of the robot to the intent of 
the owner of the robot. More recently, prominent companies have also started to 
invest heavily in “artificially intelligent machines that can build other artificially 
intelligent machines.”76 This removes humans one layer farther away from the 
actions and decisions of machines.77 If successful, this would make it more difficult 
still to trace human intent to machine behavior.78  
Together, cheap sensors, amble computational power, and artificial intelligence 
innovations like machine learning and genetic programing have reshaped what 
robots can do, where they can do it, and how little supervision they need.  
  
                                               
73 Id. at 30 (“In most cases, it’s impossible for the creators of machine learning 
programs to peer into their intricate evolving structure to understand or explain what they 
know or how they solve a problem, any more than I can look into your brain to understand 
what you are thinking about.”). 
74 Again, I will use the term “genetic programming” as a crude shorthand for a family 
of approaches. See generally J.R. KOZA, GENETIC PROGRAMMING: ON THE PROGRAMMING 
OF COMPUTERS BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, 1 (1992) (exploring whether “computers 
can solve problems without being explicitly programmed,” or, in other words, whether 
computers can “be made to do what is needed to be done without being told explicitly how 
to do it”). 
75 Id.  
76 Cade Metz, Building A.I. that Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/technology/machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-
ai.html [https://perma.cc/PWC8-M4YF]. 
77 Machines could, of course, also design machines that design machines, thus adding 
more and more layers of design between humans and outcomes.  
78 Metz, supra note 71(noting that modern robots “operate in ways that their human 
designers cannot necessarily anticipate or understand.”). 
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C.  New Social, Political, and Economic Issues 
 
These developments have led to significant engagement with issues 
surrounding robots as exemplified by a steady outpouring of TV shows, movies, and 
stories about robots killing humans and or surpassing us in intelligence and 
humanity.79  
While entertaining, the more pressing and realistic concerns raised by 
autonomous robots are found elsewhere. Robots are not competing with us for 
political or military supremacy, but they have the potential to radically alter who 
works, who holds wealth, and who is at the mercy of malfunctioning robots.80  
A fierce debate is currently taking place in numerous fields whether robots are 
simply replacing some kinds of work (e.g., truck driving) with other kind of work 
(e.g., engineering autonomous trucks) or whether autonomous robots will make 
humans obsolete altogether in many current fields of employment.81 Either way, the 
companies and people who control and own the robots will reap enormous economic 
benefits. Meanwhile, people whose jobs will be performed by robots will suffer 
economically.82  
This suggests a new era of great opportunities and dangers. Likely, the overall 
economic pie will grow,83 but the distribution of the pie will also grow ever more 
                                               
79 The contested status of quasi-human machines is an old one that runs at least to the 
Romantic literature movement of the late 18th and early 19th century. See, e.g., E.T.A. 
HOFFMAN, The Sandman, in TALES OF HOFFMAN (Penguin Classics, reprt. ed. 1982) (1816). 
More recent iterations often trace their themes and tropes to Asimov. 
80 See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 201 (“The storied robot Armageddon of book and 
film won’t actually unfold as a military conflict. Machines will not revolt and take up arms 
to challenge our dominance. Instead, it will be a slow and insidious takeover of our economy, 
barely perceptible as we willingly cede control to seemingly beneficial synthetic intellects.”). 
81 See generally MARKOFF, supra note 9, at 27  (“[Many technologists believe that] we 
are on the brink of the creation of an entire economy that runs largely without human 
intervention.”); Illah Reza Nourbakhsh, The Coming Robot Dystopia, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.–
Aug. 2015, at 23, 27 (“No fundamental barrier exists to stop the untoward march of robots 
into the labor market: almost every job, blue collar and white collar, will be at risk in an age 
of exponential progress in computing and robotics.”); KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“Whether 
the website that finds you a date or the robot that cuts your grass will do it the same way you 
do doesn’t matter. It will get the job done more quickly, accurately, and at a lower cost than 
you possibly can.”). But cf. No, Robots Aren’t Killing the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINION (Feb. 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/no-robots-arent-
killing-the-american-dream.html [https://perma.cc/LD7Q-TLD3] (arguing that robots are 
not hurting human employment as much as commonly believed). 
82 They might also suffer in other ways. Given the centrality of work to the identity of 
many people, seeing a robot perform your job (and perhaps do it better than you ever did) 
could entail its own kind of trauma.  
83 See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 9, at 9–10 (“[T]he transformations 
brought about by digital technology will be profoundly beneficial ones. We’re heading into 
an era that won’t just be different; it will be better, because we’ll be able to increase both the 
2018] HOW TO SUE A ROBOT 1039 
uneven.84 According to some estimates, roughly half of all U.S. blue-collar and 
white-collar jobs are at a high risk of significant automation.85 Even a partial 
realization of this prophecy could have dramatic economic, social, and political 
consequences. For example, recent political debates have focused on the role of 
outsourcing U.S. jobs to factories abroad.86 However, autonomous robots might be 
a bigger danger to U.S. manufacturing jobs than foreign competition.87  
Combined with concentrated wealth, the visible replacement of human labor 
with robots might already contribute to voting preferences88 and could have 
profound political consequences in the long run.89 For example, imagine if Uber 
succeeds and replaces its many human drivers with robots. What kind of political 





                                               
variety and the volume of our consumption.”). 
84 See id. at 133 (noting that “exponential, digital, and combinatorial” technological 
change is the “primary driver of growing inequality”). 
85 See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michale Osborne, The Future of Employment: How 
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, OXFORD MARTIN SCH. (Sept. 
2013),http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employmen
t.pdf) [https://perma.cc/JGT2-9VSD]; See also KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 10 (“A broad cross 
section of today’s blue-collar and white-collar jobs will soon come under threat from forged 
laborers and synthetic intellects respectively. An astonishing range of productive activities, 
both physical and mental, will become vulnerable to replacement.”).  
86 Interestingly, there is some early evidence that factories are returning to the US to be 
closer to customers but with the significant caveat that the new re-shored factories are mostly 
run by robots and few jobs compared to their old versions.  
87 Meanwhile, the foreign competition is turning increasingly away from human labor 
in favor of robots as well. See, e.g., Martin Ford, China’s Troubling Robot Revolution, N.Y. 
TIMES: OPINION (June 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/opinion/chinas-
troubling-robot-revolution.html?mcubz=1) [https://perma.cc/YF3J-Q7W7] (“Foxconn, 
which makes consumer electronics for Apple and other companies, plans to automate about 
70 percent of factory work . . . .”). Interestingly, this could contribute to a “reshoring” trend. 
See generally FORD, supra note 9, at 9 (noting a “reshoring” trend where work that was 
previously outsourced to other nations is brought back because of new technologies that, 
however, rely on fewer workers). 
88 See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Robots Can’t Vote, But They Helped Elect Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/opinion/trump-robots-
electoral-college.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading& 
module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-
col-left-region [https://perma.cc/L44B-LJZR] (“[T]he workers who experience the highest 
costs from industrial automation fit the crucial Trump voter demographic . . . .”). 
89 See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 9, at 170–73 (highlighting the 
connection between technological change, decreased social mobility, and political 
instability). 
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instigate?90 What will extreme concentrations of wealth do to democratic norms?91 
And more pressing still, how will those hurt by malfunctioning robots receive relief?  
 
D.  Responses from Substantive Law 
 
Technology leaders have recognized the massive potential inherent in artificial 
intelligence and the infiltration of robots throughout society, with many of them 
calling for significant regulation.92 Congress93 and other legislators94 are considering 
bills to regulate artificial intelligence.  
Legal scholars, similarly, have recognized that the widespread infiltration of 
robots into society could disrupt much of our substantive doctrinal frameworks. For 
example, robots are more intimately involved in creating and vetting speech than 
ever before. This has led to a lively debate in First Amendment jurisprudence about 
the status of “machine speech.”95 Scholarship on the use of machine learning 
                                               
90 See KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“[W]e may be in for an extended period of social 
turmoil.”). 
91 See generally id. at 11 (“The wealthy [who own and control the robots] will need 
few, if any, people to work for them at all.”). 
92 See, e.g., Eric Mack, Bill Gates Says You Should Worry About Artificial Intelligence, 
FORBES (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericmack/2015/01/28/bill-gates-also-
worries-artificial-intelligence-is-a-threat/ [https://perma.cc/789W-UZB5] (quoting Bill 
Gates as writing that “I am in the camp that is concerned . . . . First the machines will do a 
lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it 
well . . . . A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a 
concern.”); Peter Holley, Apple Co-Founder on Artificial Intelligence: “The Future Is Scary 
and Very Bad for People,” WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/03/24/apple-co-founder-on-
artificial-intelligence-the-future-is-scary-and-very-bad-for-people/ [https://perma.cc/2MCX 
-K2ZP] (quoting Steve Wozniak as saying that “[i]f we build these devices to take care of 
everything for us, eventually they’ll think faster than us and they’ll get rid of the slow humans 
to run companies more efficiently.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Aileen Graef, Elon 
Musk: We Are ‘Summoning a Demon’ with Artificial Intelligence, UPI (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2014/10/27/Elon-Musk-We-are-summoning-a-demon 
-with-artificial-intelligence/4191414407652/ [https://perma.cc/6AYU-BDZ7] (“I think we 
should be very careful about artificial intelligence. If I had to guess at what our biggest 
existential threat is, it’s probably that. . . . I’m increasingly inclined to think there should be 
some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure 
that we don’t do something very foolish.”). 
93 See, e.g., Fundamentally Understanding the Usability and Realistic Evolution of 
Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017, S. 2217, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/The%20FUTURE%20of%20AI%20Act%
20Introduction%20Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6YX-WGGW].  
94 See, e.g., Automated Decision Systems Used by Agencies, 2017 N.Y.C. Council, Int. 
No. 1696-A, (N.Y. 2017), legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815& 
GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0 [https://perma.cc/SCB3-H4K2]. 
95 See e.g., Wu, supra note 26; Benjamin, supra note 26; Massaro et al., supra note 26. 
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algorithms in the financial services industries is examining related issues.96 
Similarly, much of tort law is predicated on a stable notion of intent and negligence. 
However, both concepts are inherently human centric and a poor fit for how robots 
operate. For example, how does the notion of “transferred intent” apply to a robot 
that can strike and harm people but cannot form intent? Predictably, this mismatch 
between doctrine and social reality will call for modifications and clarifications of 
substantive tort rules as robots do more things that, if done by a human, might 
constitute an intentional tort or a negligent act.97 Copyright98 and patent law,99 
contracts,100 evidence,101 taxation,102 administrative law,103 criminal law, police 
regulation,104 and antitrust law105 struggle with similar questions. Much of our 
doctrinal framework could be disrupted by the rise of the machines.  
In short, substantive law scholars have recognized the growing need to 
incorporate the challenges robots pose to our doctrinal thinking. Yet, despite this 
need, procedural scholarship has not similarly responded.  
  
                                               
96 See generally Chris Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Marketplace Lending, 69 ALA. 
L. REV. 781 (2018) (describing how a newly emergent sector of the financial services 
industry uses machine learning algorithms in the context of loan underwriting to score a 
borrower’s credit application).  
97 See generally Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing how algorithmic 
decision-makers may face tort claims.). 
98 See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 30, at 21 (noting that robots, even if authors-in-fact, 
cannot hold copyrights because they have no legal personhood); see also About Magenta, 
supra note 30 (“Magenta is a Google Brain project to ask and answer the questions, ‘Can we 
use machine learning to create compelling art and music?’”). 
99 See PLOTKIN, supra note 31, at 51–52 (noting that a company used a “Creativity 
Machine” to generate patentable innovations).  
100 See generally Casey & Niblett, supra note 25 (discussing the theoretical implications 
of self-driving contracts). 
101 Roth, Machine Testimony, supra note 24, at 1972 (“[The article] explains why 
machine sources can be ‘witnesses’ under the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); see also Roth, Trial 
by Machine, supra note 24, at 1245 (exploring “the rise of ‘machines’ in criminal 
adjudication”). 
102 See, e.g., Prodhan, supra note 27 (noting the EU’s plan to make robots ‘electronic 
persons’ for tax purposes under draft plan). 
103 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1147–48 (2017) (“When 
machine-learning technology is properly understood, its use by government agencies can 
comfortably fit within conventional legal parameters.”); cf. Melissa Mortazavi, Rulemaking 
Ex Machina, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 202 (2018), 
https://columbialawreview.org/content/rulemaking-ex-machina/ [https://perma.cc/P9KN-
4822] (examining the “key ways that automation can support or hinder the legal exercise of 
agency action.”).  
104 See generally Sharkey et al., supra note 29, at 116 (noting how police departments 
increasingly rely on robots for police functions).  
105 See, e.g., MORAVEC, supra note 28, at 132–34, 139–41 (arguing that antitrust law 
must limit the growth and extent of fully automated corporations run entirely by robots). 
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Civil procedure scholarship has simply overlooked the need to deliberate 
carefully and early about the impending changes in how robots interact with society 
and fail to interact with well-established, but increasingly outdated pillars of 
procedural thinking that were designed long before autonomous robots were 
imaginable. The following sections aim to make strides to fix this lacuna, first by 
providing broad analytical frameworks and then by offering concrete proposals.  
 
II.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS  
 
There are many types of legally relevant entities out there roaming the legal 
savannah. Some, like corporations, have been with us for centuries.106 Others, like 
for-profit public benefit corporations, are more recent inventions.107 The law needs 
to account for all of them, if only, sometimes, to decide to ignore them. But before 
judges, legislators, and academics can evaluate substantive and procedural 
treatments, they must utilize an analytical framework to make sense of an entity. 
Tacitly or explicitly, the shape of the analytical framework underlies all questions 
of legal treatment.  
There is a great temptation to default into a framework without acknowledging 
such a choice or questioning its implications. All too often, this choice goes 
unnoticed and unarticulated, with wide-ranging consequences. The chosen 
analytical framework drives answers to questions large and small, from abstract 
discussions of policy, to evaluations of principles and standards, down to the nitty-
gritty of statutory construction and rule interpretation.  
This section will identify and explain three ideal-type analytical frameworks to 
evaluate entities in general and robots in particular. The first approach is ontological, 
answering question about the litigation status of robots based on their essential 
nature. The second approach is deontological, grounding litigation rights in moral 
obligations we have or do not have toward robots. The last is functional, asking 
about the practical effects of treating robots as separate from their owners. 
These frameworks can be utilized in all substantive areas of law. For example, 
a tort scholar might use them to evaluate whether a robot can form the intent to 
trespass. However, given the aims of this Article, I will focus on procedural 
questions and examples drawn from the history of procedure.  
Preferences of one framework over another affect how we resolve fundamental 
questions about the role of robots in litigation. Because of this latent influence, it is 
important to make explicit the conceptual machinery of each framework, its appeal, 
and its problems. 
 
                                               
106 Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888). 
107 See, e.g., Kevin V. Tu, Socially-Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 125 (2016) (“In response to the perception that corporate law does 
not adequately facilitate the needs of socially conscious corporations, thirty states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted Benefit Corporation statutes. These statutes adopt the 
‘Benefit Corporation’ as a new class of corporation under state law.” (citations omitted)). 
2018] HOW TO SUE A ROBOT 1043 
A.  Ontological 
 
One way we could approach the question of how to treat robots is to ask what 
they are. This approach asserts that the essential nature of a thing can guide our 
thinking about that thing.108 For example, nobody asks about the role of rocks in 
litigation because their essential nature is passive and unfeeling. Rocks share few 
fundamental attributes with entities (like persons or corporations) that can and do 
litigate.109 I will first sketch the argumentative structure of such ontological 
arguments, then illustrate the use of ontological thinking that led courts and 
commentators to grant corporations (but not animals or plants) litigation rights, 
before turning to the strengths and weaknesses of ontological thinking as applied to 
robots.  
Ontology is a branch of metaphysics.110 It is concerned with the nature of being, 
the types of entities that exist, their properties, and relations. As one of the oldest 
area of philosophical inquiry, the ontology literature is filled with obscure and 
abstract questions. However, ontology also captures a common and concrete 
approach to solve problems in the world. To understand how to deal with a new type 
of object, ask first about its fundamental nature and then analogize its core attributes 
to objects you already know. For example, in the early 1990s, commentators and 
courts inquired into the fundamental nature of the Internet to solve legal problems.111 
Is the Internet at heart a kind of common space? Or is the essence of the Internet that 
it is not locatable in any specific locale? These are abstract, ontological questions, 
but they have real consequences for how courts think about jurisdiction,112 choice of 
                                               
108 See Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 549 (“[T]transformative 
technologies tend to have essential qualities that drive the legal and policy conversations that 
attend them.”). 
109 See Pater Kahn, Jr. et al., The New Ontological Category Hypothesis in Human-
Robot Interaction, 2011 PROC. 6TH INT’L CONF. ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 159, 160 
(2011) (“For the most part, people are not confused about how to categorize most entities in 
the world. We do not, for example, talk to a brick wall and expect it to talk back, nor do we 
attribute to it mental capabilities or think of it as a possible friend. But robots appear 
different.”). 
110 And as such distinct from epistemology, ethics, or aesthetics. 
111 See, e.g., Edias Software Int’l v. Basis Int’l, 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996) 
(“The Internet can be described by a number of different metaphors, all fitting for different 
features and services that it provides. For example, the Internet resembles a highway, 
consisting of many streets leading to places where a user can find information.  The metaphor 
of the Internet as a shopping mall or supermarket, on the other hand, aptly describes the 
Internet as a place where the user can shop for goods, information, and services. Finally, the 
Internet also can be viewed as a telephone system for computers by which data bases of 
information can be downloaded to the user, as if all the information existed in the user’s 
computer’s disc drive.” (citations omitted)). 
112 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13–
25 (1996) (examining personal jurisdiction doctrine in the context of cyberspace); Allan R. 
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of 
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 411–12 (2004).  
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law,113 taxation, free speech,114 and much more.115 Sometimes, ontological thinking 
happens explicitly, but frequently such thinking is short-circuited into single terms 
that do the heavy conceptual lifting. For example, the term “cyberspace” suggests 
an electronic analogy to a physical space. Use of that term can implicitly or explicitly 
justify treatment of the Internet as a kind of locale based on the postulated essential 
nature of the Internet as a quasi-physical space.  
Ontological arguments have been used in the context of civil procedure for a 
long time. One of the clearest examples of this type of thinking concerns 
corporations. At the founding of the republic, few corporations existed.116 Within a 
few decades, they spread across the U.S. economy. Courts were quickly confronted 
with puzzling questions about how civil procedure should treat corporations. Many 
courts resorted to ontological arguments. They asked what a corporation “is,” 
inquiring into a corporation’s essential nature and attributes. Courts, over time, gave 
different answers to this ontological question. At times, they treated corporations 
akin to individuals working together (i.e., roughly large partnerships). At other 
times, they conceived of the essential nature of corporations as akin to the essential 
nature of a person because a corporation makes decisions and exhibits agency that 
cannot be reduced to the agency of the people who own the corporation. These 
answers about the ontological status of corporations then drove the procedural rights 
and opportunities afforded to corporations.117  
  
                                               
113 See, e.g., Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 313–14 (2013). 
114 See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001). 
115 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 357 (2003) (discussing the internal and external perspectives of Internet law). 
116 See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American 
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1987) (“Business corporations, of which there were 
only a handful when America adopted the constitution, grew in size and number as the 
country expanded and exploited its resources.”). 
117 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
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Similar ontological arguments, some successful and some not, were made to 
define the litigation status of cities118 and more recently of animals,119 plants, 
rivers,120 and other objects.121  
Thinking about the role of robots in litigation could proceed along similar 
lines.122 Using this framework, one first asks about the fundamental nature of a 
robot.123 Perhaps the core of robot-ness is autonomous decision-making;124 or 
servility, cold rationality, soullessness, or mechanical robustness?125 Popular culture 
furnishes many examples of stories that emphasize different aspects of each 
fundamental trait. A focus on any of these traits could furnish a foundation for a 
different assessment of litigation-worthiness. Autonomous decision-making, for 
                                               
118 See generally Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 
(1980) (examining how the law contributes to the powerlessness of cities); Sarah Lynnda 
Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227 (2018) (discussing how plaintiff cities are 
legally, morally, and sociologically legitimate). 
119 See, e.g., Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014) (plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that chimpanzees should be treated as legal 
persons for some purposes); see also Ian E. Waldick, Comment, Let Willy Free Himself: The 
Case for Expanding Standing to Marine Mammals to Challenge Regulations of the Public 
Display Industry, 31 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 117, 117–48 (2015). 
120 See Julie Turkewitz, Corporations Have Rights. Why Shouldn’t Rivers? N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/does-the-colorado-river-have-
rights-a-lawsuit-seeks-to-declare-it-a-person.html [https://perma.cc/BL42-YBFP] 
(describing a lawsuit that “ask[s] a judge to recognize the Colorado River as a person.”).  
121 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law 
and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1985) (cataloging 
lawsuits filed “in the name or interest of nonhumans—including a river, a marsh, a brook, a 
beach, a national monument, a commons, a tree, and a species—with somewhat ambiguous 
results.” (citations omitted)). 
122 See generally Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 515 (“The essential 
qualities of robotics will drive a distinct conversation.” (emphasis added)). 
123 One important implication of this approach is that it is supposed to look beyond 
superficial traits and build on more fundamental aspects of a robot being. Most notably, this 
approach avoids inquiring into whether a robot takes a humanoid physical manifestation or 
not. Notice however that human-like appearance is a vital aspect of our typical thinking about 
robots. Notice furthermore that most robots are not just modeled on generic humans, but 
male humans. Female robots are rare and trigger their own (questionable) tropes of seduction 
and deceit. Amazingly, studies suggest that people discriminate more against robots with 
feminine names than male names. See Benedict Tiong Chee Tay et al., When Stereotypes 
Meet Robots: The Effect of Gender Stereotypes on People’s Acceptance of a Security Robot, 
in ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE ERGONOMICS: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN 
COGNITION 261 (Donald Harris ed., 2013). 
124 Cf. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS 
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 11–13 (2011) (emphasizing the “intentional stance” of robots in relation 
to a “legal theory for autonomous agents.”).  
125 Cf. Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 549 (“The essential, distinguishing 
facets of robotics portend a new set of challenges centered around embodying data, 
harnessing unpredictability, and disentangling person from instrument.”). 
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example, suggests an intellectual capacity expected of litigants. Mechanical 
robustness, in contrast, does not.126  
This points to the strengths and weaknesses of ontological approaches to 
litigation capacity. The main strength is that this approach is intuitive, and perhaps 
on some level, inescapable.127 To answer what litigation capacity entity Z has, of 
course, we would like to know more about the essential qualities of Z.  
The main downside of this approach, as the example above suggests, is that it 
lacks determinacy.128 Depending on which attributes we focus on, we receive 
diametrically opposed prescriptions. This would be less of a problem if the 
underlying attributes were not controversial, but here they are. At heart, we are 
comparing non-humans to humans and inquire about the essential attributes of 
personhood.129 That might just be one of the most contentious concepts in our culture 
as exemplified in another context by debates about whether to characterize fetuses 
as persons.130  
As such, ontological arguments lack determinacy and often appear either as 
circular or elaborate smoke-screens for deontological or functional arguments.  
 
B.  Deontological 
 
A different approach to ontological thinking is deontological thinking.131 
Rather than focusing on the nature of robots, this approach focuses on the moral 
duties we have toward robots (the answer might be none) and the people who want 
to sue robots. This approach inquires into what kind of treatments are morally 
                                               
126 See also Kahn, Jr. et al., supra note 109, at 159–60 (arguing that robots occupy an 
ontological middle-ground somewhere between object and agent).  
127 For example, artificial intelligence systems themselves rely on a model of 
knowledge about a domain of objects and their attributes and relations. See generally Thomas 
R. Gruber, A Translation Approach to Portable Ontology Specifications, 5 KNOWLEDGE 
ACQUISITION 199, 199 (1993) (“To support the sharing and reuse of formally represented 
knowledge among AI systems, it is useful to define the common vocabulary in which shared 
knowledge is represented. A specification of a representational vocabulary for a shared 
domain of discourse — definitions of classes, relations, functions, and other objects — is 
called an ontology.”). 
128 Cf. Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 529 (“Few complex technologies 
have a single, stable, uncontested definition. Robots are no exception. There is some measure 
of consensus, however, around the idea that robots are mechanical objects that take the world 
in, process what they sense, and in turn act upon the world.”).  
129 Id. at 515. (“Robotics blurs the very line between people and instrument.”). 
130 See, e.g., Jonathan F. Will et al., Personhood Seeking New Life with Republican 
Control, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (noting various legislative attempts at the federal 
and state level to “provide that the rights associated with legal personhood begin at 
fertilization.”). 
131 I focus on deontological thinking as the strongest candidate within moral philosophy 
for the task at hand. Others, conceivably, will prefer arguments based on aretaic theories or 
consequentialists theories (accounted for, in part, in this and the next section, see infra 
Section II.C.).  
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permitted, required, or forbidden.132 Instead of focusing on traits that robots might 
possess, this normative approach focuses on moral obligations and duties.133 
Deontological thinking is frequently explained by contrasting it with 
consequentialist thinking.134 Consequentialists evaluate choices by the outcomes 
they produce.135 If the outcome is bringing about more “good” (however defined), 
then the choice is morally compelling.136 If the outcome reduces the overall good, 
then the choice is undesirable.137  
Deontologists question this singular focus with outcomes.138 If outcomes are all 
that mattered, then sometimes killing or hurting innocents might be justified, 
perhaps even morally required. A frequently used example of this critique postulates 
a doctor who has two dying patients in urgent need of organs. The doctor also has 
one healthy patient whose organs could save the other two. Some have argued that 
consequentialism demands that the healthy patient be killed to save the other two.139  
Deontological thinking can be understood as a rejection of the basic premise of 
consequentialism. Deontologists hold that moral judgment requires a focus on duties 
and obligations that are independent of outcomes.140 Some actions are right and 
morally required, whether they improve the overall “good” or not. Some things are 
forbidden and some required. Right takes priority over Good. By rejecting an 
analysis of effects, deontologists refocus morality on the moral norm to avoid evil. 
The main attraction of deontological thinking is that it accounts for a sense of moral 
duty that many people feel independent of elaborate calculations of consequences. 
Killing is wrong—period.141 
The main downside of deontological normativity is that it is indeterminate in 
content and scope. Just as much about consequentialism depends on how we define 
the “good” to be maximized by our choices, much about deontology depends on 
what counts as moral evil and moral duty. Even if there were widespread agreement 
                                               
132 LARRY ALEXANDER & MICHAEL MOORE, Deontological Ethics, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Winter 2016 ed.).  
133 Id. § 3. 
134 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 
894 (2000) (noting that deontologists believe that “[t]here are some acts that are morally 
wrong despite producing a net positive balance of consequences . . .”). 
135 ALEXANDER & MOORE, supra note 132, § 1. 
136 Id.  
137 This makes it easy for consequentialist to deal with robots. Often, the “good” to be 
maximized is happiness. Since robots cannot be happy, they are beyond consequentialist 
normative theories. Similarly, since robots have no capacity to “suffer” or experience “pain,” 
they are not included in the calculus of minimizing pain (unlike animals). See PETER SINGER, 
ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 8–9 (1975). 
138 There are of course many other critiques of consequentialism.  
139 See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 
(1985) (discussing various scenarios wherein consequentialism requires a holistic approach). 
140 Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 252–53 (1996). 
141 Interestingly, humans are currently hard at work to teach robots moral duties. See, 
e.g., NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 185 (2014) 
(discussing efforts to instill our core moral values into artificial agents). 
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about what counts as a moral duty, its scope is not clear. Do robots have moral 
standing? Does permanently turning off a robot count as killing a robot?  
We do have moral duties towards other humans, of course. If robots were like 
humans, then they would similarly be under the umbrella of deontological derived 
moral duties. And the human-like look of many robots makes it tempting to 
anthropomorphize robots.142 However, human-like appearances do not make 
something human.143 That said, non-human-like entities might someday have traits 
(other than appearance) that entitle them to human-like treatment.144 While unlikely, 
no account should foreclose the possibility that non-humans deserve some aspects 
of human-like treatment. More troubling still, the law is already willing to treat non-
humans such as corporations to some extent as moral agents. For example, 
corporations can incur criminal liability.145 Computer scientists and moral 
philosophers, meanwhile, are creating the emerging field of “computational ethics” 
to build morality into robots.146 Their hope is to create “artificial moral agents.”147 
Given the indeterminacy in content and scope, deontological thinking, though 
intuitive to many, is of limited usefulness in determining the litigation-rights of non-
humans.  
 
                                               
142 See generally Kate Darling, ‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-
Robot Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS 
TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 173, (Patrick Lin et al. eds. 2017) (emphasizing how people 
have a tendency to project life-like qualities onto robots that can be enhanced by 
anthropomorphizing robots through personified name or story); KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 36 
(“[AI] has a long history of exploiting our natural tendency to anthropomorphize objects that 
look or act like us in order to attract attention and increase funding.”). 
143 See Neil Richards & William Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in 
ROBOT LAW 4 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016) (“Finally, we argue that one particularly 
seductive metaphor for robots should be rejected at all costs: the idea that robots are ‘just 
like people’ . . . [w]e call this idea ‘the Android Fallacy.’”). 
144 See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and 
Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405 (2011) (arguing that artificial entities should be 
granted a legal right to personhood if they display the capacities for complex thought and 
communication, a sense of being a self, and an ability to live in a community). 
145 See, e.g., Guilty Plea Agreement at 14–15, United States of America v. BP 
Exploration & Production, Inc., No. 2:12-cr-00292-SSV-DEK (E.D. LA. Jan. 29, 2013) 
(admitting to negligently causing the deaths of eleven men and the resulting oil spill). 
146 See Cristina Baroglio et al., Special Issue: Computational Ethics and Accountability, 
18 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 40, 40 (2018); 
see also ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 44–45 (1942) (describing the seminal Three Laws of 
Robotics: “[a] robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being 
to come to harm . . . [a] robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where 
such orders would conflict with the First Law . . . a robot must protect its own existence as 
long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.”). 
147 See generally Laura Pana, Artificial Ethics: A Common Way for Human and 
Artificial Moral Agents and an Emergent Technoethical Field, 3 INT’L J. TECHNOETHICS 1 
(discussing ethics as applied to both humans and artificial moral agents).  
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C.  Functional 
 
The strongest stand-alone candidate for a conceptual framework that can 
resolve the question of robots in civil litigation is a functional account. It asks about 
the practical effects of treating robots as separate from their owners for litigation 
purposes.148 Does such treatment serve a useful function? This approach shifts our 
analytical focus away from the lofty realms of philosophy to the pressing and 
concrete demands and effects of litigation.  
Instead of asking about the fundamental nature of robots or whether they are 
due moral standing, this approach is agnostic towards ontological and deontological 
questions. Robots’ deep essence might one day resemble the essence of humans—
or not. Robots might deserve rights—or not. The functional approach sidesteps these 
(perhaps unanswerable) questions and asks instead about the practical effects of 
treating robots as separate from their owners for litigation purposes.149 How would 
this change litigation when an autonomous truck strikes a pedestrian at the 
intersection of Main Street and Erie Street? Would it be for the better or worse? 
Courts and legislators have engaged in a functional argument about artificial 
personhood before when dealing with the emergence of corporations. Corporate 
personhood in litigation is clearly a legal fiction. Corporations have no soul to 
condemn, no body to punish,150 can live forever unlike humans,151 and do not have 
sentimental feelings towards a house where their child took first steps that leads 
them to call that place home. And yet, civil procedure routinely anthropomorphizes 
corporations and asks where they are “essentially at home” for personal jurisdiction 
purposes,152 and where they are “citizens” for subject matter jurisdiction purposes.153 
                                               
148 As such, in can be understood as a modified consequentialist account.  
149 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Essay, Legal Personhood for Artificial 
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1992) (arguing that “only some of the claims 
made in the debate over the possibility of AI do make a pragmatic difference, and it is the 
pragmatic differences that ought to be decisive.”). 
150 John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 459 (1981).  
151 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“Being 
the mere creature of law, [the corporation] possesses only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
existence . . . . Among the most important are immortality, and, . . . individuality . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
152 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court 
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to 
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous 
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” (emphasis added)). 
153 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (holding that the statutory phrase “a 
corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State . . . where it has a principal place of 
business” means “the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities.” (quoting in part 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012))). 
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Commentators154 and courts155 have recognized that this artificial personhood 
metaphor is silly, but they have also successfully argued that it is useful. It serves an 
important function.  
That function is to integrate lawsuits by and against corporations into the well-
established procedural framework (developed originally for humans) without 
causing debilitating disruptions. The courts, legislators, and rule-makers believed 
that avoiding the need to create entity-specific procedures was worth some 
metaphorical fudging.156  
This is a noble goal, but it comes at a price. The bending of metaphors like 
“home” and “citizen” is not only confusing, but it introduces into well-established 
doctrines inconsistencies and incoherence. Personal jurisdiction doctrine works 
reasonably well for persons, but is in disarray in large part because of its uneasy 
extension to corporations. For example, “presence” is one of the cornerstone 
concepts of personal jurisdiction doctrine.157 Courts have repeatedly asked what it 
would mean for a corporation to be “present.”158 For humans that is a relatively easy 
inquiry: you are present where your body is located.159 But corporations do not have 
a body. They are only “present” insofar as human actors working on behalf of the 
corporation make them present. This has raised endless debates about which human 
actors, doing what kind of things, in what context, suffice for a corporation to be 
“present” in a forum.160  
                                               
154 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810–11 (1935) (arguing that “[n]obody has ever seen a corporation. 
What right have we to believe in corporations if we don’t believe in angels? To be sure, some 
of us have seen corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc. . . . [b]ut this does not give us 
the right to hypostatize, to ‘thingify,’ the corporation, and to assume that it travels about from 
State to State as mortal men travel.” And suggesting it would be much better to inquire into 
“political or ethical value judgments as to the propriety of putting financial burdens upon 
corporations . . . .”).  
155 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (accepting that, 
“[s]ince the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as 
though it were a fact, . . . it is clear that unlike an individual its ‘presence’ without, as well 
as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf 
by those who are authorized to act for it.” (citation omitted)). 
156 See generally Roger Michalski, Trans-Personal Procedures, 47 CONN. L. REV. 321 
(2014). 
157 See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding generally that a court 
can exert personal jurisdiction over a party if that party was served while physically present 
within the state).  
158 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. 326 U.S. at 316–17 (1945) (“To say that the corporation is 
so far ‘present’ there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the 
maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. 
For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those activities of the 
corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the 
demands of due process.”).  
159 Arguably the Internet has complicated even this inquiry.  
160 Since robots have a physical manifestation, their “presence” will often be easier to 
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On balance, courts and legislators decided that treating corporations mostly like 
humans for litigation purposes serves important functions. It makes litigation 
predictable and uniform while protecting litigation speed and cost.161 A functional 
account allows for such a weighing of procedural values in ways that ontological 
and deontological accounts do not.  
It allows us to measure and compare the consequences of non-property 
treatment for robots. The effects of such potential robot litigation take place in two 
settings. The first is the courtroom itself. Any account of robot litigation must 
articulate and weigh how suing robots directly would interact with the practical and 
abstract issues of litigation. On the practical side, people pursuing a functional 
approach must account for how robotic entities are compatible (or not) with long-
standing jurisdictional doctrines, service of process difficulties, the availability and 
scope of remedies, the scope of res judicata doctrines, and the hundreds of other 
nitty-gritty vital minutia of procedure. On the abstract side, functional accounts of 
robot litigation must account for broad procedural values to be protected and 
weighted against each other like speed, cost, accuracy, finality, fairness, 
accessibility, simplicity, privacy, and participation.162 Ideally a procedural system 
would further all these values, but alas, often trade-offs between these values are 
inevitable. Robot litigation would likely require a re-balancing of these procedural 
values.163  
The second setting where the availability of robot litigation has an effect is 
outside of the courtroom. Litigation rules do not only impact what happens in the 
courtroom. Instead, litigation rules affect conduct long before and after lawsuits are 
contemplated and filed.164 For example, stringent pleading standards165 might make 
it more tempting to engage in antitrust behavior because of less fear of effective 
enforcement. As such, a functional account helps us evaluate how litigation rules 
shape primary conduct.  
  
                                               
determine. But cf. infra Section IV.C.  
161 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2015) (instructing that the rules “should be 
construed, administered, and employed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”).  
162 See generally Roger Michalski, The Clash of Procedural Values, 22 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 61 (2018). 
163 For example, treating robots simply as property would certainly be simple and keep 
doctrinal confusion at bay, but might make it increasingly difficult for harmed individuals to 
access courts to obtain relief (as the examples in the introduction illustrated). See generally 
Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 537 (“[T]he law will face the question, maybe 
soon, and likely often, of what to do when a digital object made up of bits becomes a physical 
object made up of atoms. . . . [T]he set of compromises we have in place today—the balances 
lawmakers, courts, and regulators have struck—will plausibly unwind in the coming 
decades.”).  
164 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting 
that litigation rules might “substantially affect . . . primary decisions respecting human 
conduct . . . .”). 
165 See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
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In the context of robot litigation such effects on primary conduct could take 
multiple forms. Most notably, it might affect whether companies hire robots or 
humans to do their work. If robots make it difficult to establish personal jurisdiction 
over a company in an unfavorable forum, this might tip a company’s decision away 
from hiring humans in that forum. Similarly, the contours of robot litigation rules 
might affect whether work is performed locally by a company from nearby or from 
abroad.  
All in all, a functional account is uniquely suited to account for the economic, 
social, and political consequences of integrating robots into civil litigation or 
continuing to treat them as mere property. In contrast, ontological and deontological 
thinking can resemble an empty vessel into which we pour our policy-preferences, 
biases, hopes, and prejudices all in the name of essential claims of existence or 
thoughts.  
That is not to say that ontological and deontological thinking have no role to 
play. An ideal model of robot litigation would satisfy ontological and deontological 
and functional requirements. However, such a model is unlikely. Realistically, we 
must settle for reasonable trade-offs between these three analytical approaches. To 
receive widespread acceptance, a model of robot litigation must be above a minimal 
threshold on all three analytical frameworks, and a good match on at least one. The 
next section will go on the hunt for a model of robot litigation that satisfies this test. 
 
III.  POSSIBLE MODELS 
 
This Part applies the ontological, deontological, and functional frameworks to 
evaluate numerous concrete contestant models for treating non-humans as litigation 
entities. The possibilities are broad,166 ranging from treating robots for litigation 
purposes as employees, slaves, franchisees, subsidiaries, children, animals, agents, 
or subcontractors. Each will be evaluated in turn. The resulting taxonomy exposes 
the weaknesses of analogizing robots to established models. None fits, and all would 
have negative practical consequences.167 As courts will encounter more litigation 
involving robots, they will likely try to fit robots into one of these models. It is 
therefore important to dispel these attempts before case law builds up in favor of one 
of these models.  
This Part concludes by exposing the great Faustian bargain inherent in treating 
robots as something other than property. Analogizing robots to an existing model 
would make enforcement of laws easier, but would also lower how much can be 
recovered in enforcement. 
 
                                               
166 See generally SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 306–08 (P.J. Fitzgerald ed., 12th ed. 
1966) (“[L]egal personality is not limited by any logical necessity, or indeed by any obvious 
requirement of expedience, to the incorporation of bodies of individual persons.”). 
167 The discussion is focused on procedure. I will leave aside here whether these models 
might make sense in other contexts (e.g., tort, contract, antitrust, etc.). See infra Part IV. 
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A.  The Default: Robots as Property or Things 
 
The current default model is that robots are things without independent 
litigation status. Robots are property. To sue a robot is to sue its owner. Robots have 
no separate status from their owners.  
This conception of robots as mere property has important consequences in 
procedure. For example, property alone cannot serve as an independent basis for 
personal jurisdiction.168 An autonomous robot driving around in Montana cannot, on 
its own, create the basis for Montana courts to assert jurisdiction over the robot. As 
the Supreme Court argued in the seminal case of Shaffer v. Heitner, “[t]he phrase, 
‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’ is a customary elliptical way of referring to 
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.”169 As such, Montana courts 
would have to analyze the contacts of the robot’s owners with Montana to determine 
whether its courts could hear the case consistent with constitutional limitations on 
their powers.170  
The robot’s presence in Montana, while not an automatic way to gain 
jurisdiction in Montana, could still be used to establish jurisdiction in Montana. 
However, only in a roundabout way. Plaintiffs would need to argue that the presence 
of the robot indicates contacts between the robot’s owner and Montana in relation to 
the lawsuit at hand that satisfy the minimum contacts test. This might be doable if 
the controversy is about the ownership of the robot itself.171 But it might be very 
difficult or impossible where the autonomous robot caused harm (say, in a highway 
accident).  
Since the robot is mere property, it cannot have intent, it cannot establish 
independent contacts with Montana, and it cannot avail itself of the benefits and 
protections of Montana. Only the robot’s owner can do that. But since the robot 
acted autonomously, there never was the need for the robot’s owner to intend 
anything in Montana, to establish contacts with Montana, or to purposefully avail 
herself of anything in Montana.  
  
                                               
168 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (“The fiction that an assertion of 
jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the 
property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued 
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to 
the defendant.”). 
169 Id. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 
introductory note (1971)). 
170 Id. (“[I]n order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction 
must be sufficient to justify exercising ‘jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
171 Id. (“[T]he presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction 
by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, 
when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located 
not to have jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). 
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Similarly, the robot by itself is not “at home” anywhere for general jurisdiction. 
Only the owner (a person or corporation) might be at home in a U.S. jurisdiction. 
Thus, even if the robot was created in Montana, spent all of its time in Montana, 
worked in Montana, used Montanan roads and services, it still is not “at home” in 
Montana and Montana’s courts cannot exert general jurisdiction over the robot. 
The conception of robots as property thus provides a shield to the robot’s owner 
that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to sue the robot or its owner in Montana. If the 
robot’s owner is foreign, perhaps no domestic court would be available for such a 
plaintiff.  
Similarly, treating robots as property has ramifications across the procedural 
spectrum: robots cannot have citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes, are not 
contemplated by long-arm and venue statutes, are not part of the forum non 
conveniens analysis,172 cannot be sanctioned for spoliation of evidence, and have no 
ability to be implead nor the capacity to plead. Furthermore, there is no mechanism 
to serve process on a robot, no choice-of-law preferences, and no other procedural 
doctrine, statute, or rule that enables, hinders, or facilitates robot litigation. 
To sue a robot is thus currently like suing a car that hit you on the intersection. 
You figure out who owns the car and sue that person. This stands in sharp contrast 
to injuries caused by corporations. In those instances, the suit is not against the 
owners of the corporation, but the corporation directly. The justifications for this 
difference are manifold. First, separate corporate existence provides a liability 
limitation that encourages investment in corporations and overall economic activity. 
Liability of a corporation is (typically) limited to the assets of the corporation, not 
the assets of the owners of the corporation.173 A person who buys stock in a large 
corporation must only fear losing the value of that stock, not that litigants could 
come to satisfy judgments against the corporation with the assets of the stockholder. 
A second reason for treating corporate litigation separate from the owners is 
litigation ease. For example, serving process on corporations is relatively easy, 
cheap, and straight-forward.174 Serving process on everybody who has a stake in the 
corporation, in contrast, would be anything but.  
This discussion points to the appeal and downside of treating robots as property. 
On the ontological side, it is intuitive to treat robots as property for litigation 
purposes because they are property. They are things that can be bought, sold, 
activated, deactivated, or modified. As with all chattel, so the argument goes, there 
is no role in litigation for robots separate from their owners. The rebuttal is that 
robots are a strange and perhaps new kind of chattel—property that can or soon will 
be able to act autonomously in meaningful ways. Some robots appear to make 
                                               
172 Except perhaps under the prong testing for “relative ease of access to sources of 
proof.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981). 
173 See, e.g., John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. 
L. REV. 445, 446 (2004) (noting that limited liability is the “bedrock proposition of corporate 
law that a shareholder’s risk of loss is generally limited to the amount of the shareholder’s 
investment.”). 
174 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h). 
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decisions that cannot be traced back in any straightforward manner to their owners. 
The result is that people might not be able to tell whether the car next to them is 
driven by a human or an autonomous robot. That puts robots, one might argue, into 
a new kind of property category. I doubt that will affect anytime soon whether robots 
can or cannot be sold, but robot autonomy suggests an ontological status beyond 
what a traditional, non-autonomous car might enjoy.  
This ontological tension is on a spectrum. Currently, treating robots as property 
is uncontroversial and most robots do not differ in fundamental ways from more 
traditional machines. However, if robots grow more autonomous, their litigation 
status as property will seem increasingly antiquated.  
Technological advances will likely make the treatment of robots as property for 
litigation purposes seem increasingly out of touch. Perhaps robots cannot, on some 
fundamental level, form intent (to establish contacts with a forum for personal 
jurisdiction purposes or form an intent to establish a domicile somewhere). But they 
can act in ways and contexts where ascribing intent has intuitive, and perhaps one 
day popular, appeal. That would undermine our treatment of robots as chattel for 
litigation purposes.  
The main functional reasons why robots might not be treated as chattel is that 
such treatment within the current doctrinal framework makes it difficult and 
expensive for injured parties to recover. The widespread use of autonomous robots 
will likely provide a new economic bounty,175 but this bounty will be accompanied 
by endless robot malfunctions and mishaps. The law will have to provide an answer 
for who should bear the significant burden for robot accidents and litigation 
involving robots.  
Procedure is part of the answer because no amount of substantive law remedies 
is useful if concrete plaintiffs cannot invoke the courts to access such remedies. 
Treatment of robots as property will make it easier for the owners of autonomous 
robots to deploy robot workers from distant states or countries with little fear of 
litigation in unfavorable forums where their robots might have caused harm. 
Plaintiffs will find it difficult to pursue remedies close to home and states will find 
it difficult to tax and regulate foreign robots. A treatment of robots as something 
other than property for litigation purposes might make it easier for injured parties to 
recover for their injuries.  
There is, however, a significant downside to treating robots as something other 
than property of their owners. While such treatment might make it easier to satisfy 
jurisdictional hurdles and choice-of-law limitations, it could also limit how much 
plaintiffs could recover. The tradeoff, as the following sections will show, is often 
between ease of recovery and extent of recovery.  
 
B.  Corporate Variations 
 
Another model is to treat robots like corporations. Like robots, corporations are 
inherently human owned (directly or indirectly), controlled by humans, and can exist 
                                               
175 See supra notes 83–87. 
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for a broad spectrum of purposes.176 Even if we do not treat robots like corporations, 
robots will still likely confront the law as corporations with increased frequency. As 
others have pointed out, “wrapping each synthetic intellect in its own legal 
corporation” is easy and cheap to do.177 Incorporating robots “as an asset of its own 
legal entity” would insulate assets from liability to prevent “a single catastrophic 
[robot] mistake to bankrupt [an] entire enterprise.”178 While clearly beneficial to the 
owner of the robot, this approach of wrapping robots in corporate blankets leaves 
parties injured by the catastrophic mistake with no or limited ability to collect 
damages. Their suffering would, in effect, subsidize robot ownership and 
experimentation.  
The main appeal of treating robots like corporations is that civil procedure has 
well-established and efficient means for dealing with corporate litigants. For 
example, corporations are citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes in their state of 
incorporation and their “principal place of business.”179 Robots, similarly, could be 
deemed citizen for federal subject matter jurisdiction purposes where they were 
created180 and where they conduct most of their activities.181 
However, treating robots as corporations makes little sense from a corporate 
law standpoint. The corporate-robot analogy fails in terms of formation, decision-
making, and accountability. Corporations must be incorporated and must follow 
state corporate law. There is nothing about robots that suggests that such processes 
must be followed. I can build a robot in my garage without ever informing the state 
or thinking about establishing a new kind of legal entity. I cannot incorporate a 
corporation without state involvement and a high degree of intentionality.  
  
                                               
176 Cities and municipal organizations (still sometimes called “municipal corporations”) 
were and are also often analogized to corporations (and vice versa). See generally Frug, 
supra note 118, at 1082 (“It must be understood that before the nineteenth century, there was 
no distinction in England or in America between public and private corporations, between 
businesses and cities. As a legal matter, all these corporations had the same rights.”). 
177 KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 91. 
178 Id.  
179 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 
180 Though, again, there are important boundary issues. For example, it might be 
difficult to define clearly where a robot is “created.” Is it the place where a robot is first 
physically assembled, where the software is first installed, where the software is last updated 
(or significantly altered), where it is first booted up, where it first acts autonomously, etc.? 
181 Predictably, there will also be robots that cross national borders and create new 
subject matter jurisdiction puzzles. For example, when does a domestically created and 
initially domestically active robot lose its US-based state citizenship when acting abroad? 
(E.g. a truck that used to conduct its affairs in Minnesota but then crossed to Canada and has 
been active there for months or years). Similarly, is a robot created abroad that is shipped to 
the US and conducts all of its activities domestically more like a foreigner, dual-citizen, 
undocumented immigrant, or permanent resident?  
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The rights and protections incorporation affords are granted by states 
conditional on numerous and often intricate requirements and rules. In contrast, 
robots do not have and cannot have an internal governing structure akin to 
corporations. Corporate decision-making rules are therefore inapplicable and 
common accountability measures fail.  
Similarly, because of the special relationship between a corporation and its 
chart-granting state, a relationship that is absent for robots, corporate treatment is a 
poor fit for robot litigation.  
A related corporate template is subsidiary treatment for robots. Subsidiaries are 
legal entities that are separate from their corporate owners. Civil procedure over time 
has developed ways to account for subsidiaries. For example, personal jurisdiction 
doctrine treats, generally, a subsidiary’s contacts with a forum as distinct from a 
parent company’s contacts with that forum.182 However, there are ways to pierce the 
veil between a subsidiary and the parent company and treat the contacts as 
originating from the same source.183  
The main appeal of modeling robot litigation on how subsidiaries are currently 
integrated into the litigation process is that it provides a built-in method to probe the 
level of control or independence of the parent company over the subsidiary and 
assign procedural and liability consequences to that variation. For example, 
plaintiffs can aggregate the jurisdictional contacts of a parent company that treats 
the subsidiary simply as part of a unitary business.184 Similarly, courts could test 
whether a robot is acting above a threshold of autonomy or whether the robot’s 
owner effectively controls the robot. Depending on where a robot falls on that 
spectrum, courts could either treat the robot as a separate jurisdictional entity (like a 
true subsidiary) or aggregate jurisdictional contacts (like a subsidiary in name only 
that is fully integrated into the parent company).  
While tempting, treating robots as subsidiaries of their owners fails for two 
reasons. The first reason is based on the difficulties of probing and assigning control 
when it comes to robots. With subsidiaries, courts can examine emails and 
memoranda to test whether the subsidiary acts independently or is controlled by the 
parent company. With robots, a similar analysis would entail the analysis of 
complex, dynamic,185 and often inscrutable code that does not lend itself to easy 
                                               
182 See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930 
(2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 135 (2014).  
183 See e.g., Jennifer A. Schwartz, Piercing the Corporate Veil of an Alien Parent for 
Jurisdictional Purposes: A Proposal for a Standard that Comports with Due Process, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 731, 731–32 (2008); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An 
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1048 (1991) (“Courts pierced the veil in about 
40% of reported cases.”). 
184 See, e.g., Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 121–22. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen 
Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, 
and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14, 29–30 (1986) (explaining that combining parent and 
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry “comparable to the corporate law 
question of piercing the corporate veil.”). 
185 For example, many neural network-styled robots might adapt over time to new input 
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interpretation.186 For example, does tilting a robot’s neural network to seek work in 
warm and humid weather show that the robot’s owner directed the robot to work in 
Florida? Even if a robot’s code could be analyzed in this manner, doing so would be 
time intensive and dependent on the work of extremely costly experts. In many cases 
(say a run-of-the-mill car accident case), plaintiffs would be unlikely to shoulder 
such costs early in the lifecycle of a case simply to establish jurisdiction.187  
Beyond the difficulty of operationalizing the autonomy spectrum in actual 
cases, another reason why a subsidiary-like treatment for robots fails is that it relies 
on treating robots, again, as corporations (subsidiaries are by definition business 
entities). For the reasons we saw above (formation, management, taxation, and 
regulation), such treatment fails ontological and functional frameworks.188 
 
C.  Vicarious Entities 
 
In agency law, a principal engages an agent to act on her behalf.189 This creates 
an agency relationship. While the agent is engaged within the scope of the agreed 
relationship, he is acting within the scope of his agency. The principal is responsible 
for the liability the agent incurs (as agent, rather than as her private self).190 The 
substantive law imputes the agent’s actions to the principal. Similarly, jurisdictional 
contacts of the agent can be imputed to the principal.191 For example, the agent’s 
contacts with Montana on behalf of the principal might subject the principal to suit 
in Montana under a modern personal jurisdiction analysis.192  
                                               
without preserving a record of the previous configuration that existed at the time of, say, an 
accident.  
186 This approach could also encourage robot owners to avoid clear instructions and 
write inscrutable (and perhaps inefficient) code precisely to make a jurisdictional analysis 
more cumbersome. This is undesirable from a policy and aesthetic perspective.  
187 That is to say nothing of Rule 11 complications. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“By 
presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, 
submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the 
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances . . . (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery . . . .”). 
188 See supra notes 184–187 and accompanying text. 
189 See generally 2A C.J.S. Agency § 34 (“An agency relationship is created when there 
is mutual consent, express or implied, that the agent is to act on behalf and for the benefit of 
the principal and subject to the principal’s control.”). 
190 See generally id. § 410 (“A duly authorized agent may act for and bind the principal, 
thereby subjecting the principal to liability.” (citations omitted)). 
191 See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 184, at 2. 
192 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (noting that 
corporate contacts are measured by the contacts “of the corporation’s agent within the state 
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”). But cf. 
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1023, 1032 (2004) (“I argue in these pages, against the grain of judicial and academic 
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The power of agency law in procedure is that it gives courts tools to examine 
when a person’s activities can be imputed to another. That imputation hinges on the 
scope of the agency and whether the person, at any given point in time, acted within 
the agreed-upon scope (thus allowing imputation) or not (thus undermining 
imputation). 
An agent model could serve as the foundation of robot litigation by recognizing 
that robots act on behalf of somebody else (their owners) but could potentially act 
beyond the intent and authorization of the owners.193 For example, a robot endowed 
with complex machine learning processes might one day do something that was 
unanticipated (and maybe un-anticipatable) by the owner and should not be imputed 
to the owner.  
The fundamental problem with an agent approach to robot litigation is that 
agents and principals must voluntarily consent to establish this kind of relationship. 
Beyond merely providing a normative foundation for liability based on consent, this 
moment of establishing an agency relationship serves to define the contours of the 
agent’s authorization (and thus also the principal’s liability). But robots cannot 
consent to become agents, cannot enter a mutual agreement, have no ability to 
negotiate the scope of authorization, cannot dissolve the agent-principal 
relationship, and cannot renegotiate the terms of the relationship. Because of the lack 
of consent to become an agent, there is no normative or practical boundary to the 
robot’s agency. Everything the robot does would be attributable to the principal. 
This would reduce the agent model back to a property-based litigation model, adding 
no analytical tools to account for the ontological, in-between status and capabilities 
of robots.  
Other vicarious entity models fail along the same lines. For example, robots 
cannot be franchisees because they cannot consent to establish a contractually 
defined relationship to the franchisor. Similarly, robots cannot be treated as 
subcontractors or independent contractors because they cannot contract in any 
meaningful way with their owners. Finally, robots cannot be treated as employees 
for litigation purposes because of their inability to define the scope of their 
employment.194  
  
                                               
wisdom, that the use of veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes is unwarranted as a matter 
of precedent and unwise as a matter of policy.”). 
193 KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 73 (noting from a practical and moral but not necessarily 
legal standpoint that “[w]e need to control when and where synthetic intellects (or any 
electronic agent, for that matter) are permitted to act on our behalf. This need is particularly 
acute when they commingle with human agents.”). 
194 Cf. KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 6 (referring to robots who work beyond factory floors 
as “forged laborers.”);  FORD, supra note 9, at xii (noting that recent technological shifts are 
challenging “our most basic assumptions,” including “that machines are tools that increase 
the productivity of workers. Instead, machines themselves are turning into workers . . . .”). 
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Contract-based models might be attractive to the robot’s owners (allowing, for 
example, advantageous indemnification and forum selection clauses). But they 
cannot serve as foundations for robot litigation models because robots cannot 
provide the built-in pushback and ability to negotiate that furnishes the normative 
and practical appeal of vicarious entity models.  
 
D.  Slaves 
 
Another possible model, though a terrible one, is that of the slave.195 
Antebellum laws in the United States provided detailed rules to govern the legal 
status of slaves.196 These rules provided for a slave’s ability to sue and be sued and 
liability rules.  
All of these rules were founded on abhorrent morals and on a conceptual 
contradiction: slaves were treated as property yet, unquestionably, had some agency. 
Even the staunchest and blindest defenders of slavery recognized that slaves could 
and often did make their own choices.197 This presented a conundrum for slave legal 
codes—as property, all the slaves’ liability was ultimately the slave owner’s 
liability,198 but as agents, they could engage in behavior that was disconnected from 
the slave’s owner.199 Slaves were property that could change hands through wills 
and contracts, but slaves were also considered persons when accused of crimes (after 
all, true property cannot commit crimes). Slaves could not be a party to a lawsuit200 
                                               
195 The following paragraphs are a gross simplification of a complex, dynamic, and 
fluid field. Others have written far more knowledgably and thoroughly on this topic.  
196 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, “Yearning to Breathe 
Free”: Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (1993). 
197 Ranging from the monumental (e.g. escaping to freedom) to the mundane 
(negligently driving a horse cart).  
198 See, e.g., WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND 
ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 290 (1968); Thomas D. Morris, As If the Injury Was Effected by the 
Natural Elements of Air, or Fire: Slave Wrongs and the Liability of Masters, 16 L. & SOC’Y 
R. 569, 569–99 (1981). 
199 See, e.g., Ewing v. Thompson, 13 Mo. 132, 138 (Mo. 1850) (“The power of the 
master being limited, his responsibility is proportioned accordingly. It does not extend to the 
willful and wanton aggressions of the slave except where the statute has expressly 
provided.”); Ingram v. Linn, 4 Tex. 266, 269 (Tex. 1849) (“[T]he master is answerable for 
the misconduct and negligence of his slave when acting in the immediate employment, or 
under the authority, of the master. . . . But this liability does not extend to unauthorized acts, 
committed by the servant, out of the course of his employment.” (citations omitted)); Snee 
v. Trice, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 345, 348 (1802) (noting the need to protect slave owners from 
absolute liability that “would place all the slave-owners in the state at the mercy of their 
numerous slaves, who might commit what trespasses, or be guilty of what neglects and 
omissions they thought proper, to the ruin of their masters.”). 
200 See, e.g., JACOB D. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY 
197 n.1 (1837) (“It would be an idle form and ceremony to make a slave a party to a suit, by 
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yet were able to sue for their freedom.201 As chattel, slaves could not hold property 
yet could (at times and under constraints) have separate funds.202 Slaves could not 
independently contract, but slave owners could (sometimes) be bound by the 
contracts slaves made.203  
Strikingly, this description and the contradictions it entails is, on first sight, a 
good fit for robots. Somewhat akin to slaves, robots are property but also capable of 
making (some) autonomous decisions. This is a scary and striking fit—chattel that 
works for a human owner and is defined as quasi-human without legal and moral 
protections.  
While a fitting model in some ways, I urge courts to refuse analogizing robots 
to slaves and to reject this model. Antebellum slavery codes should not serve as a 
model for, really, anything. They are morally repulsive. Let’s leave them buried in 
the ashes of history.204 
 
E.  Children, Incompetents, and Animals 
 
There are, of course, numerous other possible models. They are, however, 
increasingly untenable. For example, one could analogize robots to children or 
incompetents.205 All are, arguably, somewhat autonomous but less capable than most 
adults. Litigation rules account for this difference by specifying persons that can sue 
and be sued on behalf of the minor or incompetent person.206 However, elsewhere 
statutes provide that minors and incompetents have an independent jurisdictional 
status from their guardians.207 Procedure, in short, conceptualizes minors and 
incompetents as separate from others, but tethered to their control in litigation 
matters. Robots could similarly combine elements of independence (say in 
jurisdictional matters) with elements of control (say in liability matters).  
                                               
the instrumentality of which he could recover nothing; or if a recovery could be had, the 
instant it was recovered would belong to the master. The slave can possess nothing; he can 
hold nothing. He is, therefore, not a competent party to a suit. And the same rule prevails 
wherever slavery is tolerated, whether there be legislative enactments on the subject or not.”). 
201 See generally LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM 
BEFORE DRED SCOTT (2014) (documenting the story of law suits by people held as slaves 
who claimed that they were free). 
202 Called a “peculium.” 
203 See, e.g., Chastain v. Zach & Bowman, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 270, 270 (1833). 
204 The very attempt to analogize robots to slaves might also be disrespectful to the 
suffering slaves had to endure.  
205 “Incompetents” strikes me as an ill-chosen moniker. I use it here only because that 
is the term used in various Rules and statutes. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (“Unless federal 
law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a 
person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a judicial district of the United 
States . . . .”). 
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). 
207 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2012) (“[T]he legal representative of an infant or 
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or 
incompetent.”). 
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Though attractive in some ways, the model ultimately fails to meet basic 
ontological and deontological thresholds.208 Robots are not young humans and not 
like young humans. They will not grow up to be full adults. Even if they did, the 
robot’s owners are not the robot’s parents, tasked with a special privilege and duty 
to raise the next generation of humanity. Similarly, parents and society owe 
incompetents special care and protections arising from their fundamental humanity 
that cannot be extended to robots. As such, it would be strange indeed to extend to 
robots the protections and concern afforded to minors and incompetents when it 
comes to, for example, default judgments209 or the approval of settlements.210 
Yet another model for robot litigation would be to treat robots like (dangerous) 
animals.211 Robots are a bit like animals in that they have owners who are responsible 
for them, but the law also recognizes that animals might act and cause damage on 
their own. This model might be useful in other areas of law (e.g., tort) but it does not 
help with procedural issues raised by robots because procedure does not provide 
special rules for litigation involving animals (animals are just chattel).212  
 
F.  The Faustian Bargain 
 
While all of the above models fail to provide workable accounts for robot 
litigation, they are instructive of a Faustian bargain embedded in existing non-human 
litigation. In various forms and mixtures, each model presents a tradeoff between 
ease of enforcement and recovery limitation. For example, treating robots as 
property would make it difficult to sue a robot with a foreign owner close to home, 
but a successful suit would provide full access to the owner’s assets. Treating robots 
as subsidiaries, in contrast, would make a suit against the robot close to home easier 
than suing the parent, but recovery can only be had from the subsidiary robot, not 
the parent.213 This would create an unnecessary hardship for parties injured by 
                                               
208 As it did in other contexts, though for different reasons. For example, some courts 
treated Native American Tribes as wards of the federal government. This approach implied 
that the federal government could sue on behalf of tribes but the tribes could not vindicate 
their rights on their own. See generally Richard B. Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People 
Without Law, 5 INDIGENOUS L.J. 83, 95–101 (2006) (discussing leaders who believed that 
without reform, “Indians had no legal rights at all.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1505.  
209 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1) (stating that clerks may not enter default judgments against 
either “a minor [or] an incompetent person.”). 
210 Contrary to all other cases (except class actions), judges must approve or disapprove 
settlements involving minors and incompetents. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. CIV. R. 17-1.2 (“No 
claim in any action involving a minor or incompetent person shall be settled, compromised, 
or dismissed without leave of the Court embodied in an order, judgment, or decree.”). 
211 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(“For strict liability to attach, it is not required that the animal be ‘vicious’ or aggressive; a 
finding of the animal’s abnormal ‘dangerousness’ is sufficient.”). 
212 But see generally Kate Darling, Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots, in ROBOT 
LAW (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2015) (proposing limited substantive rights for robots based on 
the analogy of animal abuse protections). 
213 The primary behavior effect of such a rule would be that owners would, all else 
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robots. Relying on an existing model as guidance for the shape of robot litigation 
would make us choose between ease of litigation versus ease of recovery. Given the 
potential for a new economic bounty for owners of robots and the potential for 
numerous injuries caused by robots, this is an undesirable Faustian bargain.  
Luckily, there is no conceptual or normative necessity for striking such a 
bargain (on whichever side of the spectrum).214 Choosing a model for robot litigation 
affords us the chance, if taken early and decisively, to transcend past limitations and 
fashion a fresh litigation model that provides injured parties with access to courts 
and access to recovery.  
The argument against such a proposal is that it would be unfair to robot owners 
to create special robot litigation rules that deviate from the usual litigation fabric. 
Potentially, such litigation rules could also stifle economic activity (discouraging 
the deployment of robots) and innovation (discouraging R&D into robot 
technology).  
These arguments are important but not decisive. While litigation rules generally 
apply to all litigants and all types of suits, there are many, many exceptions to the 
trans-substantive and trans-personal norms. As such, while these norms are 
important, we have recognized time and again that these norms can and should be 
violated when warranted by specific litigation needs and vulnerabilities.  
Robot litigation presents such an instance. As noted, the owners of robots in the 
future will likely possess far greater economic means than a typical member of the 
broad public. As such, owners of robots will possess far greater means to defend 
lawsuits away from home than plaintiffs injured by robots. Denying such plaintiffs 
access to recovery could lead to hostility towards robots that, in the long run, could 
result in public opinion and legislation far more harmful to robot owners and the 
economy as a whole. The remainder of this Article will examine what robot litigation 
beyond the Faustian bargain entails.  
 
IV.  THE PROPOSED SOLUTION, TIMING, PROBLEMS, AND GRAY SPACES 
 
The previous Part explored whether existing models for nontypical human 
litigation could be applied to robots. The central argument was that none of these 
models are a good fit. All failed minimal ontological, deontological, or functional 
thresholds. None seem like a good choice. But choose we must (if only to choose to 
remain with the current default). To move forward and to solve the Faustian bargain 
between access to enforcement and access to remedies, this Part argues that we must 
treat robots as a new litigation category that borrows insights selectively and 
partially from the range of existing models. For example, we must craft a new in 
                                               
being equal, build cheaper robots who control little or no assets (because confiscation of the 
robot and the robot’s assets to satisfy a judgment would hurt the owner less). A non-
subsidiary treatment in contrast might lead to the development of robots that are more 
expensive and that control more assets.  
214 I leave aside here the question whether this kind of bargain is desirable for other 
models of litigation.  
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robotam personal jurisdiction doctrine to supplement the old in personam 
jurisdiction doctrine.215 We must develop separate standards for how a robot can 
establish a domicile for choice-of-law purposes, how liability is shared between 
robot and owner, and the many other procedural rules that hinge on an understanding 
of intent, personhood, and independent agency. Only by unshackling robots from 
existing litigation frameworks can we escape the old Faustian bargain.  
This proposed solution is not without problems and ambiguities (as later 
sections discuss). Still, it provides a viable, flexible, and pragmatic framework to 
account for changing technological capabilities and emerging social norms about 
how to integrate robots into everyday interactions.  
 
A.  Solution: Split the bundle 
 
The previous sections all implied that procedural treatment can and sometimes 
should be separate from substantive treatment. For example, churches and federal 
agencies might be treated differently for First Amendment purposes, but both litigate 
under the same pleading rules.216 Meanwhile, they might be treated the same under 
substantive contract law but different for service of process purposes.217 
In short, we recognize in many areas the value of de-coupling substance from 
procedure. As such, different procedural treatment for robots in the litigation context 
does not necessitate changing how we tax and (substantively) regulate robots. 
Contract law may develop separate rules for robot contracting—or not. Tort might 
establish unique standards for robot negligence and intent—or not. Similarly, 
contract rules might borrow from the insights of robot torts or reject them. The 
procedural proposal here has little to say about how substantive legal rules should 
treat robots. The argument simply recognizes that robots present unique litigation 
problems that are best resolved by creating a unique bundle of solutions.218  
These unique solutions cannot be based entirely on one of the existing litigation 
models. Instead, we must develop a new synthesis based on the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing models. Such a synthesis must account for the special, in-
between ontological status of robots as well as innumerable practical and political 
value judgments (briefly, to encourage innovation in robot technology but also 
                                               
215 Other scholars have made similar arguments that particular classes of litigants call 
for different personal jurisdiction analyses. See, e.g., William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, 
Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (offering a “theory of 
personal jurisdiction over aliens” under which “alienage status broadens the geographic 
range for minimum contacts from a single state to the whole nation.”). 
216 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (setting forth the pleading requirements for all 
claims for relief in federal court).  
217 Compare FED. R. CIV. P 4(h) (outlining the rule for serving corporations) with id. 
4(i) (outlining the rule for serving the United States and related entities).  
218 See Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First 
Amendment Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 591 (noting that “[t]he algorithmic ‘author,’ 
it turns out, gets framed differently by [copyright and First Amendment law], with differently 
disruptive results.”). 
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protect those injured by robots). This necessitates a rethinking of different areas of 
procedure and tailoring each to the challenges robots pose.  
Civil procedure did this before with the advent of corporations. Courts could 
have treated corporations like individuals, government entities, or some other 
established model.219 For a while, courts attempted to fit corporations into one of the 
existing folds. But in time the shortcomings of such an accommodationist approach 
became apparent. Corporations simply are not like individuals or government 
entities (an ontological argument). They are not due the same respect (a 
deontological perspective). And treating them like individuals or government 
entities undermines important litigation values (a functional point).  
As a result, courts and legislators went to work, over many decades, and crafted 
litigation rules for corporations that were attentive to the unique nature and 
functioning of corporations in the U.S. economy and society. For example, Congress 
amended the diversity jurisdiction statute repeatedly to redefine citizenship for 
corporations.220 Currently, corporations, unlike humans, can have citizenship in two 
states.221 This is a strange result, until one recognizes that it is simply the political 
compromise to ongoing debates about corporations’ access to federal courts.222 The 
Supreme Court, similarly, continues to weigh in on how to integrate corporations 
into the usual litigation fabric and how to set them apart.223 Likewise, numerous 
procedural rules and statutes are uniquely addressed to corporations.224 
In doing so, legislators and courts created numerous special litigation rules for 
corporations but also left many litigation rules untouched. The challenges of 
corporate litigation necessitated a doctrine-by-doctrine, rule-by-rule, statute-by-
statute approach. Each had to be evaluated and either modified or retained. This is 
an ongoing project.  
  
                                               
219 Mark, supra note 116, at 1445 (“Several conceptions of the corporation were 
available to theorists and policy makers. Corporations could have been seen as analogous to 
either individuals or governments. Alternatively, these analogies could have been rejected 
and theorists and policymakers could have developed an entirely new body of law to 
supersede contemporary doctrine.”). 
220 See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958 (1992) (examining the 
patterns of disputes between individuals and national corporations surrounding federal 
diversity jurisdiction between the 1870s and the 1940s). 
221 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).  
222 Or, as it is more commonly put: access to federal courts for plaintiffs who sue 
corporations. See PURCELL supra note 220, at 4. (“[N]ational corporations favor[] the federal 
courts”)  
223 See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–97 (2010).  
224 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1(a) (“A nongovernmental corporate party must . . . . ”); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (“This rule applies when one or more shareholders or members of a 
corporation or an unincorporated association bring a derivative action to enforce a right that 
the corporation or association may properly assert but has failed to enforce.”). 
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Similarly, courts and legislators must soon reevaluate innumerable litigation 
rules with an eye toward creating exceptions for robot litigation. Of course, such an 
approach is super cumbersome and will likely create new doctrinal complexity and 
confusion. The alternative, however, is to jam an increasingly square peg into a 
round hole.  
 
B.  Timing Questions 
 
There remains the question of timing. When should we launch such a project? 
Somebody might believe that robots, in some distant future, could raise new 
procedural problems but doubt that the time has already come to tackle this question. 
Perhaps the question of timing is best left to substantive law considerations. Until 
the day when robots are deemed by legislators to hold property, one could argue, it 
makes little practical sense anyway to think of robots as separate from their owners 
for litigation purposes because, at the end of the day, there is no recovery to be had 
from them directly anyway.  
This argument, while intuitive in some ways, fails for an abstract and a concrete 
reason. On the abstract side, the argument above implicitly assumes the primacy of 
substantive over procedural concerns.225 It holds that substance must first recognize 
robot personhood before procedure can follow the lead and recognize robot litigation 
rules. However, there is no necessity for such a blunt assertion of primacy. Procedure 
is concerned with enforcement of substantive rules, whatever they might be. 
Plaintiffs injured by robots must be able to enforce, say tort rules against them as 
much as plaintiffs who were injured by corporations. If robots raise new 
jurisdictional challenges, then procedure can resolve these challenges without 
having to wait for substantive tort law to change (similarly, tort law must not await 
procedural changes to create, say, a new robot battery rule).226  
Beyond this abstract argument about the relationship between substantive law 
and procedure, there is also a practical reason to reject a holding-pattern approach 
in procedure until robots can hold property in their own name. Recovery from robots 
is available even before they can have their own Swiss bank accounts.227 There is 
nothing that prevents garnishment of wages or income from robot activities. For 
example, imagine a robo-truck that makes deliveries in a state where it causes harm. 
The plaintiff could ask for a percentage of the future income the robot generates 
from future deliveries until the judgment is satisfied. Similarly, a successful plaintiff 
who wins a judgment against a robot could seize the robot itself. Alas, that might be  
 
 
                                               
225 I leave aside here the massive and persistent problems of drawing the line between 
the two.  
226 For example, on the federal level, the Rules Enabling Act allows federal courts to 
promulgate rules that structure the enforcement of existing substantive law as long as they 
do “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).  
227 I leave aside here the issue of injunctions.  
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the only valuable asset that the robot owner has in that jurisdiction anyway. As a 
matter of timing, there is nothing that prevents procedure from engaging with these 
questions before substantive law adjusts to robot liability itself.  
Also, the rise of cryptocurrency disrupts traditional thinking about rules 
surrounding the control of assets. Cryptocurrencies have no built-in conditions 
concerning who can control, use, spend, and accumulate them. As such, a robot truck 
could accumulate bitcoins (say through completing deliveries) and spend bitcoins 
(say on fuel and repairs) without having to wait for the law to allow it to hold 
property in its own name. 
More fundamentally still, law (whether substantive or procedural in nature) 
should not wait for technology to create facts and then simply react to new facts.228 
Law unavoidably is intertwined with shaping new technologies because innovators, 
entrepreneurs, and society create and use new technology with legal entitlements 
and liabilities in mind.229 Questions of timing might thus be misplaced in the sense 
that the legal construction of the meaning of robots is already ongoing,230 whether 
procedure innovates or chooses to hold on to the current treatment of robots as 
property.  
 
C.  Problems and Gray spaces 
 
Beyond timing questions there are numerous problems with the proposed 
solution of creating a new category of robot litigation rules. Relatedly, there are 
numerous gray spaces and ambiguities that will complicate any attempts to treat 
robots for litigation purposes as anything other than property (no matter how 
problematic that categorizations is in its own right).  
First, robots as defined and discussed here are physical objects.231 However, 
one might question this emphasis on material embodiments of complex algorithms. 
Notice, for example, that the term “robots” is frequently applied to essentially non-
physical programs that never interact with humans in the material world.232 Clearly, 
                                               
228 See Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of Technological 
Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw 6 (June 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=29818 [https://perma.cc/KQF2-FDY4] 
(“[U]ntil recently the debate around technological exceptionalism has been not whether it 
exists, but when it exists. When is a technology so new and so different that it will drive 
significant legal change? When is a technology so novel that the law, as established, breaks 
and cannot account for it?”). 
229 See Kaminski, supra note 218, at 590 (“The law can itself drive technological 
development; technologists often design around legal entitlements.”). 
230 See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Tax Bill Favors Adding Robots over Workers, Critics Say, 
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2017, 5:01 PM) https://www.npr.org/2017/12/08/569118310/ 
tax-bill-favors-adding-robots-over-workers-critics-say [https://perma.cc/XYW6-DQPU] 
(noting that some argue that recent tax reforms “expand incentives for companies to buy 
robots and machines that replace workers.”). 
231 See supra Section I.A. 
232 See, e.g., Elaine Glusac, Meet Your New Data-Driven Travel Agent, N.Y. TIMES 
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a sophisticated program that we encounter over the internet might display autonomy 
similar to the autonomy displayed by a self-driving car. For example, a virtual 
assistant without a clear physical embodiment might learn your travel routines and 
anticipate your needs and desires and, on its own, make suitable reservations at your 
new favorite shawarma restaurant in a town you have never visited before.  
Still, it is important and reasonable to emphasize the physical nature of a robot 
(as opposed to a detached algorithm). Robots embodied in physical shells force 
themselves upon us in ways that naked algorithms do not. Walking down the road 
from my home I might encounter an autonomously driving car whether I want to or 
not. In contrast, I typically must take an affirmative step to come into contact with 
an algorithm in the cloud. For example, I must have decided to engage the 
aforementioned travel agent.233 That choice opens the normative and legal 
foundation for a contractual relationship that entails, among many other things, the 
possibility of a forum-selection clause.234 Since there never was a contract with the 
unwillingly encountered autonomous car and no possibility to negotiate a forum-
selection clause, my ability to recover for damages depends on jurisdictional 
doctrines that are fundamentally premised on physical contacts. Insisting on a 
material embodiment for a robot thus has important jurisdictional consequences.235 
Robots are not just code. They are code embodied in a shell that can be encountered 
out there in the world.236 That makes them different from nonphysical algorithms.  
                                               
(July 10, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/travel/meet-your-next-travel-agent-
diy-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/E9VL-6J9F] (“New-wave [travel] agents 
[might be] human, robotic or a combination . . . . ”).  
233 But cf. Yaniv Leviathan & Yossi Matias, Google Duplex: An AI System for 
Accomplishing Real-World Tasks over the Phone, GOOGLE AI BLOG (May 8, 2018), 
https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/05/duplex-ai-system-for-natural-conversation.html 
[https://perma.cc/CL6L-AVWU]. 
234 Form-selection clauses can be one-sided, of course, and used abusively. But those 
are problems with forum-selection clause doctrine, not robots or algorithms. See, e.g., 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590–91 (1991); Atlantic Marine Const. 
Co., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59–60 (2013); 
See generally Roger Michalski, Transferred Justice: An Empirical Account of Federal 
Transfers in the Wake of Atlantic Marine, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1289 (2016).  
235 Despite the misleading language, algorithms “in the cloud” still have a concrete 
physical manifestation. After all, the algorithm must run on some hardware that must be 
hosed and located somewhere. However, users typically do not know and do not care where 
an algorithm that they are using is “located.” Even if they did, it might change instantly or 
could be the product of sub-algorithms working together that are located in different location. 
Given these additional complexities, I will leave the issue of algorithm jurisdiction aside 
here. See Kristen Eichensehr, Data Extraterritoriality, 95 TEX. L. REV. 145, 145 (2017) 
(“Data’s intangibility poses significant difficulties for determining where data is located. The 
problem is not that data is located nowhere, but that it may be located anywhere, and at least 
parts of it may be located nearly everywhere. And access to data does not depend on physical 
proximity.” (citations omitted)). 
236 As embodied code it also is easier to count instances. Each physical robot is its own 
jurisdictional entity. With algorithms, counting entities can be more difficult. Is Siri one thing 
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The second objection is similarly definitional. Just how autonomous does a 
robot have to be?237 After all, robots predictably will fall on a broad spectrum of 
autonomy. On one side of the spectrum might be robots that act autonomously only 
rarely, in narrowly defined circumstances, and only for a short time. For example, 
some flying drones might contain fail-safe tools that allow them to autonomously 
return to the place from where they were launched should their radio-link to a human 
controller fail or be interrupted. On the other side of the spectrum we might imagine 
autonomous trucks that operate for years with little or no human input, ferrying 
cargo back and forth between warehouses based on delivery orders that no human 
ever approved or reviewed. Where, on this spectrum, should procedure draw the 
line? This is a difficult question that undoubtedly will be impacted by advances in 
technology and our social understanding of robots.238 As an initial matter, I 
suggested above (built into the definition of robots used in this Article) a human-
centric definition: robots that display near, at, or beyond human autonomy should 
be treated differently than devices that show only minimal autonomy. I suspect that 
fairly soon there will be robots for which this question of how much autonomy is 
enough will be easy to answer. And undoubtedly there will always be robots that fall 
into a narrow band of space somewhere in the middle between no autonomy and full 
autonomy where reasonable people could disagree. Still, the presence of some 
entities in this middle gray space does not undermine the important conceptual and 
normative work accomplished by drawing a reasonable line between autonomous 
robots and non-autonomous devices.239  
                                               
(in the cloud, accessed by many) or is it many things (one instance in each iPhone)? That 
being said, counting robots could also prove difficult in the future because significant 
research emphasizes the value of swarm robotics where many physical components come 
together (for long or short period of times) in constantly changing constellations to 
accomplish tasks. See e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the potential military 
application of “swarm robotics”). 
237 This question quickly leads to a philosophical morass about the nature of thought, 
the self, self-awareness, independent reasoning, creativity, adaptability, consciousness, and 
the essence of humanity itself. See generally A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 442 (1950) (arguing that instead of discussing essential traits, our 
focus should be on external manifestations of thought processes as illustrated by an 
“imitation game” where a human has to guess whether she is interacting with another human 
or a machine). 
238 It is complicated further by the strong likelihood that many robots will work in 
collaboration with humans yet still make their own decisions. Separating human decision-
making from robot decision-making in such circumstances promises to be a massive 
headache. However, it is unavoidable. If we do not decide such question at the jurisdictional 
stage, we just delay the decision to the liability stage.  
239 Similarly, substantive law will have to confront and answer this definitional 
question. See, e.g.,  Scherer, supra note 64, at 395 (calling for a government agency that can 
will establish an AI safety certification process); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 83 (2017) (“This Article proposes that certain classes of new algorithms 
should not be permitted to be distributed or sold without approval from a government agency 
designed along the lines of the FDA.”).  
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D.  In the Crystal Ball 
 
So far, we mostly focused on robot defendants. But can they sue as well as 
plaintiffs? As part of a class? As an entire class without non-robot litigants? These 
are seemingly small issues, but they point to a larger concern: creep.  
There is a danger in treating autonomous robots as something other than 
property for litigation purposes that is highly speculative and highly problematic. 
Separating robots from their owners for procedural purposes can lay the groundwork 
for separating them from owners for other purposes as well. A procedural status as 
something other than property can be the beginning for a substantive status as 
something other than property.240 Perhaps a kind of artificial person entitled to basic 
and constitutional rights. Slowly, unintentionally, clandestinely, robots could build 
on procedural foundations to become substantive rights bearers.241  
This is not mere fantasy. Something like it has happened once before. 
Corporations acquired a unique status in procedural affairs long before they started 
to amass substantive rights, cumulating, for now, in claims to constitutional 
protections previously only afforded to humans.242  
This possibility of procedural changes laying the foundation for substantive 
rights gives great urgency to procedural discussions about the status of robots in our 
legal system.243 Much of this is speculative. However, given our path-dependent 
legal system, small decisions now can have significant and unintended ramifications 
down the road.  
                                               
240 See, e.g., Open Letter to the European Commission Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics, ROBOTICS-OPENLETTER.EU, http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R6ZL-XR4C] (“A legal status for a robot can’t derive from the Natural Person model, since 
the robot would then hold human rights, such as the right to dignity, the right to its integrity, 
the right to remuneration or the right to citizenship, thus directly confronting the Human 
rights. This would be in contradiction with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.”); See also Ivana Kottasová, Experts Warn Europe: Don’t Grant Robots Rights, 
CNN TECH, (Apr. 12, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/12/technology/robots-rights-
experts-warn-europe/index.html [https://perma.cc/PB69-UVXF]. 
241 See Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 515 (“[R]obots, more so than any 
technology in history, feel to us like social actors—a tendency so strong that soldiers 
sometimes jeopardize themselves to preserve the ‘lives’ of military robots in the field.”). 
242 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The 
Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”). 
243 See KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 199–200 (“There’s nothing to stop a synthetic intellect, 
whether enshrined in law as an artificial person or crudely wrapped in a corporate shell, from 
outcompeting us at our own game. Such entities could amass vast fortunes, dominate 
markets, buy up land, own natural resources, and ultimately employ legions of humans as 
their nominees, fiduciaries, and agents—and that’s in the happy event that they deign to use 
as at all. The slave becomes the master.”). 




The rise of robotics out there in the shared world has massive implications for 
how we tax, how we regulate, how we think about responsibilities, intent, and rights. 
All of these substantive questions will pass, sooner or later, through litigation 
because laws and regulations do not enforce themselves. Substantive law is already 
adjusting to autonomous robots, but procedure has not similarly engaged with the 
thorny questions raised by robots.  
Doing so will require a tremendous amount of guesswork, continuous 
adjusting, and admitting folly.244 It will also require rethinking many areas of 
procedural law to meet the unique challenges robot litigation presents. As such, this 
Article is not a final answer to the questions of robot litigation, but a call to scholars 
to address doctrine-by-doctrine, statute-by-statute, and rule-by-rule the places where 
our unitary litigation framework will hold and identify the places where it will need 
to be adjusted. This work is practical, political, philosophical, and ultimately as 
unavoidable as an autonomous car hurtling straight at you on the highway. 
                                               
244 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 14, at 383 (“Predicting the future is a surefire way 
to embarrass oneself.”). 
